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SUMMARY 
This working paper examines the history of the search 
for solutions to protracted displacement. Focusing 
specifically on the Horn of Africa, East Africa, the 
Middle East and South Asia, the paper analyses past 
policy responses that explicitly or implicitly address 
situations of extended exile. In addition, the paper 
examines the potential of translocal mobility and con-
nectivity as an individual- or household-level solution 
to displacement. 
The concern to find solutions for long-term displace-
ment situations has been a key driver for the evolution 
of the international refugee protection regime ever 
since its initiation in the interwar period. Yet, only 
more recently have these efforts crystallised around 
the notions of ‘durable solutions’ and ‘protracted dis-
placement’. The emergence of the latter concept in the 
1990s reflects challenges arising from the globalisation 
of the international refugee protection regime, the 
massive growth of displacement in the Global South 
and the increasingly limited availability of long-term 
solutions from the late 1970s onwards. From a histor-
ical perspective, efforts to resolve specific protracted 
displacement situations have been diverse, devised in 
response to both domestic and international con-
straints and opportunities. The current shift away from 
the conventional durable solutions—return, integra-
tion and resettlement—to less fixed solutions thus can 
be seen as a return to historically dominant practices 
of a more context-driven search for solutions. 
Research reviewed for this paper supports the TRAFIG 
project’s hypothesis that mobility and connectivity 
practices can help displaced persons cope with pro-
tracted displacement, and in some cases, find more 
durable solutions for themselves. Yet, both mobility 
and connectivity also have a stratifying effect, increas-
ing the gap between those who have access to these 
and those who do not. Historically, different forms of 
assisted mobility for refugees to third countries have 
been instrumental in resolving particular displacement 
situations, such as in the interwar period, the post-
World War II period and in Indo-China in the 1970s and 
1980s. In the current context, neither organised mobil-
ity nor individual options for mobility are available to 
the same extent.   
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Introduction
This working paper seeks to examine historical aspects of pro-
tracted displacement and responses to it. Key concerns include 
how protracted displacement situations were addressed in the 
past, what solutions were proposed and to what extent translocal 
mobilities and connections provided solutions, however individual, 
to protracted refugee situations. An overarching concern of the 
paper is what lessons can be drawn from past efforts to address 
protracted displacement situations, and specifically what lessons 
can be learnt from past successes and failures in relation to current 
displacement crises. 
In doing so, we use the conceptualisation of protracted displace-
ment developed in the TRAFIG project. According to this concep-
tualisation, protracted displacement results from the prolonged 
unavailability of (durable) solutions for displaced persons. More 
specifically, protracted displacement can be understood “as a 
specific social constellation, in which the capabilities of displaced 
persons to rebuild their lives after displacement and the opportuni-
ties available to do so are severely limited for prolonged periods of 
time” (Etzold, Belloni, King, Kraler, & Pastore, 2019, p. 20). This 
capacity is “shaped by distinct structural forces that limit migrants’ 
agency in three distinct directions, namely displacing forces, 
marginalising forces and immobilising forces” (Etzold et al., 2019, 
p. 17), mirroring, but not entirely equivalent to the conventional 
triad of durable solutions (repatriation, local integration or resettle-
ment) promoted by UNHCR. Displacing forces prevent displaced 
person’s return, marginalising forces hinder their integration while 
immobilising forces block their onward mobility (Etzold et al., 
2019, p. 20). 
The paper examines protracted displacement situations after 
World War II both in a global perspective and with a particular 
focus on the four regions covered by the TRAFIG project (East  
Africa, Horn of Africa, the Middle East, with a focus on Palestinian 
and Syrian refugees and South Asia, with an emphasis on Afghan 
refugees). The paper seeks to draw lessons from responses to pro-
tracted displacement in these four regions, while also seeking to 
understand the role of transnational connectivity among refugees 
and refugee mobilities in coping with protracted displacement. 
The paper will proceed as follows: In Section 1, we will review the 
concept of protracted displacement from a historical perspective. 
We will do so in two steps. We will first briefly review key ele-
ments in the development of the modern refugee regime, focusing 
on the search for practical solutions for individual refugees, or 
‘durable solutions’ as they are called today. In a second step, we 
will trace the more immediate debates leading to the elaboration of 
the concept of protracted displacement in the early 2000s and the 
ensuing debates on extended exile and durable solutions. 
In Section 2, we will zoom in on concrete policy responses to pro-
tracted displacement in the four regions covered by the TRAFIG 
project. Finally, Section 3 will examine the existing literature on 
past protracted displacement situations as to the role of transna-
tional links, mobilities and connectivity as coping strategies for 
protracted displacement. In the Conclusion, we will draw out key 
messages following from the review of the history of protracted 
displacement and responses to it. 
Note on methodology
This paper is based on a two-part approach: For one, the au-
thors conducted a desk review of the relevant literature as the 
basis of a general review of broader studies on displacement, 
the international refugee regime and protracted displacement 
that provides a framework for the entire study and Section 
1. Sections 2 to 3 are based on case studies undertaken by 
TRAFIG researchers on the Middle East (Knudsen, 2019; 
Tobin, 2019a), East Africa (Wilson & Kwaks, 2019), the Horn of 
Africa (Noack, 2019) and South Asia (Mielke, 2019). 
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Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 1989 for broad historical accounts). 
In many ways, the development of an international refugee pro-
tection regime, beginning with the appointment of a High Com-
missioner for Refugees under the League of Nations in 1921 as 
well as subsequent institutional and legal innovations, notably 
the establishment of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950 and the subsequent adoption of 
the Geneva Refugee Convention in 1951 and its 1967 Protocol, 
can be understood as international responses to situations of 
extended exile in which individuals and whole communities 
found themselves. 
However, it was not until the early 2000s that protracted 
displacement situations were identified as a specific problem 
requiring particular policy and academic attention and that the 
concept of “protracted refugee situations” understood by the 
UNHCR (2004) as situations of a “long-lasting and intractable 
state of limbo” was defined. 
This said, the underlying policy problems such as the unavaila-
bility of durable solutions, the resulting precarious situation of 
refugees in extended exile, the impact of legal limbo situations 
on refugees’ livelihoods, well-being, psychological state and 
other dimensions of human development, and on a macro-level, 
aid dependency and the potential negative development impacts 
on receiving countries have been a longer-standing subject of 
debate, and so has the search for solutions to these challenges. 
1.1  A short history of “durable solutions” 
1.1.1  The search for durable solutions at the 
origins of the international refugee regime
As argued above, the search for ‘durable solutions’ for refu-
gees has not only been a main driver of the development of the 
modern refugee regime but also the initial focus of the embry-
onic refugee protection regime established under the League 
of Nations with the appointment of Fritjof Nansen—the former 
polar explorer—as its first High Commissioner for Refugees 
in 1921. Nansen, who had served as the head of the Norwegian 
delegation to the League of Nations since the latter’s establish-
ment, had previously already been appointed as the League’s 
High Commissioner for Prisoners of War and also served as a 
High Commissioner for relief for Russians affected by famine 
in 1921 on behalf of voluntary agencies (Chetail, 2003; Holborn, 
1975, p. 6). In both these roles, he was confronted with the 
situation of displaced persons who required legal and practical 
support in repatriation or who were indeed unable or unwilling 
to return to their countries of origin. 
1. The concept of protracted  
displacement from a historical  
perspective 
Refugees are not a new phenomenon. History abounds of sto-
ries of forced migration. However, the advent and globalisation 
of the modern nation-state as the dominant form of political 
organisation, concomitant ideologies of statehood and nation-
alism, increased state capacity, related ideologies of the state as 
the central agent of social and political change and the associ-
ated expansion of the state’s reach into society have dramati-
cally increased states’ capacity for persecution and the exercise 
of force and violence against its own population. In the context 
of weak state legitimacy in many countries of the Global South 
and the state’s role in allocating and providing access to scarce 
resources, the very organisational form of the modern (nation) 
state has contributed to chronic conflict over who controls the 
state, causing displacement both internally and across borders.
At the same time, the reproduction of “juridical statehood” 
(Jackson & Rosberg, 1986) on the international level has meant 
that the state continues to be relevant as a mechanism to access 
resources even after collapse, keeping conflict over control over 
its remnants (cf. Clapham, 2010). In respect to African states, 
Englebert (2009, p. 52) notes that the “capacity of African rulers 
to privately appropriate the resources of the state or to use it as 
an instrument of private predation is a well-established element 
in the logic of survival and reproduction”, describing the key 
sources of conflict, namely competing claims to the state and 
conflicts over the resources of the state. What Englebert finds 
striking and telling about current forms of statehood is that 
there is no relationship between state failure and state dissolu-
tion (Englebert, 2009, chapter 1). 
From a comparative perspective, the formation of new states 
(Zolberg, 1983) and state collapse (cf. Mazrui, 1995) have been 
found to contribute to conflict, persecution and related displace-
ment. The spread of state failure and state collapse (Rotberg, 
2004; Zartman, 1995), and “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999; Münkler, 
2005; Duffield, 2014) after the end of the Cold War have been 
held responsible for the massive increase in displacement and 
internal displacement in particular (Cohen & Deng, 1998; 
Duffield, 2014), although in the eyes of some commentators, 
these should be seen as symptoms of a more fundamental social 
fragility (Betts & Collier, 2018, pp. 15–33; Duffield, 2014). 
Like displacement in general, there are numerous examples of 
situations of extended exile characterised by precarious living 
conditions, legal limbo and lack of rights. Examples include the 
situation of refugees displaced in the Balkan Wars in the late 
19th and early 20th century, refugees in Asia Minor displaced 
in the wake of World War I or the situation of displaced persons 
in Europe after World War II (see Gatrell, 2015; Ther, 2017;  
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The position of the High Commissioner for Refugees was 
established after the International Committee of the Red Cross 
appealed to the League of Nations in August 1921 to assist 
Russian refugees in the civil war (Chetail, 2003). Nansen was 
provided with limited resources, essentially covering admin-
istrative expenses of his small office, which was understood to 
be temporary (Holborn, 1975, p. 7). His mandate was to assist 
“any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy or who no 
longer enjoys the protection of the Government of the USSR, 
and who has not acquired another nationality” (quoted after 
Gatrell, 2015, p. 55). His mandate was subsequently extended 
to assist Armenian, Assyrian and certain other smaller refugee 
groups (Mohr, 2019).1  Apart from advocacy on behalf of refu-
gees under his mandate and providing practical legal support, 
Nansen also worked towards the establishment of a travel doc-
ument for refugees—the so-called Nansen passport, endorsed 
in principle by 54 governments following an intergovernmental 
conference called by Nansen in July 1922 (Holborn, 1975, p. 9). 
While not per se implying a right to abode or access to work, 
it allowed refugees to prove their identity with a recognised 
document, a significant step towards accessing rights in coun-
tries of residence (Chetail, 2003; see also Gatrell, 2015, p. 56). 
According to Louise Holborn, a German-American academic 
and avid chronicler of the interwar and early post-World War 
II international refugee protection regime, Nansen remained 
concerned with the question “of the final disposition of refugees 
either by repatriation, employment in the country of refuge, or 
resettlement overseas” until his death. According to her, the 
primary goal of the office was to “turn as quickly from relief 
and charity to measures which would enable refugees to be 
self-supporting” (Holborn 1975, pp. 8–9). 
To this end, Nansen initiated a census of refugees, implemented 
in cooperation with the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) that was meant to provide information on numbers, age, 
sex and profession of the refugees with a view of matching 
their skills with available job opportunities and finding jobs for 
them, mostly in other countries. Between 1925 and 1929, when 
ILO took over the operational task of job placement, the ILO 
assisted some 60,000 refugees under the mandate of Nansen’s 
office in finding employment. Mobility—facilitated by the 
Nansen passport—was crucial for this purpose. The number of 
unemployed refugees dropped even more significantly during 
this time (Holborn, 1975, p. 13). In addition, Nansen also saw 
the passport as an instrument of ‘burden-sharing’: by enabling 
refugees to “travel to a third country to find work, the under-
lying purpose being to distribute (....) refugees more equitable 
1 Institutionally, Nansen’s office was succeeded in 1931—shortly after Nansen’s 
death in 1930—by the International Nansen Office, headed by the chair of its 
governing body. In 1933, a separate High Commissioner for Refugees coming 
from Germany was appointed. These two offices were merged in 1939 in the 
office of the High Commissioner for Refugees under Protection of the League 
of Nations, formally in existence until 1946.
among member countries of the League of Nations” (Gatrell, 
2015, p. 16; see also Long, 2013, p. 10). The main purpose of the 
Nansen passport thus was very practical: To enable refugees to 
find a durable solution. As Long (2013, pp. 10–11) has argued, 
“their ‘problem’ was viewed above all as one of economic 
poverty, which was compounded by their difficulties in estab-
lishing a legal identity in the new world of nation states”. The 
(limited) legal protection the Nansen passport provided was 
thus primarily seen in instrumental terms—to facilitate onward 
movement and settlement. 
1.1.2  The different faces of durable solutions in 
the interwar period
While finding durable solution in the sense of refugees’ ability 
to be self-supporting—through employment—was one of the 
main, if not the main task of Nansen’s office, the office also in-
tervened in a wide range of legal matters on behalf of refugees, 
to obtain legal documents, secure social security or lift employ-
ment restrictions (Holborn, 1975, p. 11), again in an effort to 
find (more) durable solutions for refugees and to help to remove 
all sorts of practical obstacles that stood in the way of doing so. 
The 1933 Convention on the International Status of Refugees 
consolidated a range of intergovernmental arrangements agreed 
during the 1920s into one document and also specified a set 
of rights refugees (Russians and Armenians) were entitled to 
under the Convention (such as access to courts, access to work 
and education) (Holborn, 1975, p. 15). 
The most important feature of the interwar refugee regime was 
that it was not universal or permanent, but ad hoc and group-
based. As is clear from the circumstances under which the 
office of the High Commissioner was created, and other groups 
were subsequently added, group-based protection arrangements 
were a response to the significant presence of these specific 
groups, their humanitarian needs, their inability to return and 
the potential of destabilisation associated with the continuing 
presence of particular groups of displaced persons (Easton-Cal-
abria, 2015, p. 416). 
What concerns the driving forces for establishing a system 
of international protection, refugee assistance in the interwar 
period thus anticipated some of the elements of the securitisa-
tion of humanitarian aid and development and the use of aid 
to defuse and thus contain disorder observed as characteristic 
for the recent past (cf. Duffield, 2001, 2014 [2001]). Indeed, 
as Craig Calhoun (2008, p. 85) suggests in his review of the 
history of humanitarian action, the notion of ‘emergency’ 
“became a sort of counterpoint to the idea of global order” from 
the interwar period onwards, demanding immediate action to 
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Indeed, in Nansen’s—and many of his contemporaries’—view, 
the population exchange was a necessary and workable solution 
to a ‘minority problem’: Re-allocating minorities to kin-states, 
in his view, pre-empted further unorderly displacement (Skran 
& Daughtry, 2007, p. 26; Ther, 2017, p. 88). That those so moved 
still did experience the population transfer as a tragedy and, 
despite some international aid provided especially to Greece, 
continued to live in miserable and marginalised circumstances 
for years to come was not seen as a contradiction at the time. 
To resolve the ‘reintegration’ of ‘their’ citizens was seen as a 
task for Greece and Turkey (and Bulgaria, where a comparable 
if much smaller population exchange took place) and not for the 
international community (see for a detailed account Gatrell, 
2015, pp. 62–72). The situation of those populations that were 
‘exchanged’ underlines the close linkage of refugeehood as 
a political and legal construction and citizenship and the role 
of refugee status as a form of surrogate citizenship, which by 
virtue of this association is not open to nationals. Especially 
in respect to Greece, emigration to other countries, notably 
Australia, France, the United States and Egypt helped to defuse 
the emergency somewhat, even if immigration restrictions 
for eastern and southern Europeans after 1924 meant that the 
United States was no longer an option (Ther, 2017, pp. 91–92).
 
As Skran and Daughtry (2007, pp. 25–26) note, there was wide-
spread consensus among academic observers that the Treaty 
of Lausanne succeeded to resolve the refugee and minority sit-
uation that arose in the wake of the Greek–Turkish war. It was 
only in the 1950s that the first critical voices were raised. While 
there were several earlier examples of population transfers 
(cf. Ther, 2017, p. 88), it was the population exchange between 
Greece and Turkey and the Treaty of Lausanne that became a 
model for ‘resolving’ subsequent crises involving ethnic and/or 
religious minorities both in Europe—where multiple popula-
tion transfers were executed in the wake of World War II—and 
elsewhere, notably in the context of the division of India. 
1.1.3  Resolving the post-war crisis of displacement 
after WW II: From repatriation to resettlement
The crisis of displacement after World War II by far dwarfed 
displacement in the post-World War I period. Historian Peter 
Gatrell (2015, p. 3) thus estimates the number of displaced 
people in Europe in the immediate aftermath of World War II 
at some 60 million—as opposed to some 12 million after World 
War I (of whom two million were in the Balkans).3  Globally,  
 
 
 
 
3 Schrover, Vosters & Glynn (2019) speak of 26 million refugees—14 million 
displaced persons and 12 million (largely German) expellees.
address consequent human suffering and to restore order. By 
contrast, individual persecution grounds played a minor, if any, 
role in the initial institutionalisation of protection.2  As Keith 
Watenpaugh’s history of the role of Middle East in the making 
of modern humanitarianism suggests (Watenpaugh, 2015,  
p. 21ff), not individual human rights violations, but rather 
broader notions of shared humanity and human dignity in-
formed humanitarianism in the interwar period, of which the 
League’s refugee protection regime formed a part.
Nansen’s office’s practical assistance of refugees under its 
mandate to become self-reliant and economically independent 
can be described as a “bottom-up” form of livelihood assis-
tance to refugees as Evan Elise Eaton-Calabria (2015) argues. 
It was a form of support of durable solutions sensitive to the 
preferences of refugees themselves, which amongst others 
included refugees in designing and managing relief efforts and 
running micro-credit schemes to provide refugees with start-up 
capital for small-scale entrepreneurship (Easton-Calabria, 
2015; Long, 2013). One should add, though, that this bottom-up 
approach was in large part born out of necessity in the absence 
of financial means or a mandate that would have allowed a more 
directive approach rather than a deliberate strategy (cf. Easton-  
Calabria, 2015, p. 417). 
At the same time, prescriptive, top-down solutions were 
pursued as well. The most striking example of these is the 
population exchange between Greece and Turkey following the 
Treaty of Lausanne (1923) that ended the Greek–Turkish war 
(1919–1922). Nansen was closely involved in negotiating the 
Treaty and, specifically, its provisions on the compulsory pop-
ulation exchange, involving the relocation of Greek Orthodox 
minorities in Turkey (excluding Constantinople) to Greece and 
that of Muslim minorities in Greece to Turkey. Subsequently, 
Nansen’s office also helped to implement the Treaty by tem-
porarily assisting ‘exchanged’ populations after their reloca-
tion (Psomiades, 2011), mobilising both emergency aid and 
longer-term support to help their ‘local integration’ (Holborn, 
1939). However, Nansen viewed those relocated as result of the 
Lausanne Treaty to fall somewhat outside his core mandate: 
While they did require assistance, they were not in need of 
international protection as he saw it, as they had a state to turn 
to, reflecting the dominant view at the time that the main legal 
feature of refugees was that they lacked the diplomatic protec-
tion of their state of origin, or in today’s terms, that they were 
de facto stateless (cf. Skran & Daughtry, 2007, p. 20; see also 
Watenpaugh, 2015, chapter 1). 
2 Individual persecution grounds were of course central for Jewish refugees 
from Germany for which a separate High Commissioner was appointed in 
1933. The latter was unable, however, to make a significant impact in the face 
of a hostile international environment and soon resigned (Zolberg, Suhrke & 
Aguayo, 1989, p. 19).
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Much like in the interwar years, the problem of refugees was 
largely construed as a humanitarian one, although this time, the 
long-term solution to be promoted was repatriation rather than 
the movement to a third country or local integration as had been 
the case with refugees under the mandate of the League. In ad-
dition, return was imposed on (non-Jewish) displaced persons, 
with no other alternatives offered, and sometimes, outright 
force was being used (Gatrell, 2015, pp. 95–96). 
Reflecting the exclusive focus on return, UNRRA did not have 
the mandate to settle displaced persons outside of their country 
of origin (Holborn, 1975, p. 26). Altogether, some seven million 
displaced persons were returned to their countries of origin 
under UNRRA’s mandate. However, returns dropped consid-
erably after 1945, indicating that other solutions would have to 
be sought for the remaining displaced persons (Holborn, 1975). 
The declining number of returns and the increasing opposition 
to the promotion of return to the Soviet Union and other Sovi-
et-controlled countries became a major issue of contestation 
between the East and the West (cf. Loescher, 1993, pp. 48–49). 
At the same time, another predecessor organisation of UNHCR, 
the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICGR) estab-
lished in 1938 outside of the League of Nations to support the 
“orderly emigration of German refugees”5  was tasked to assist 
“all persons (...) who, as a result of events in Europe (...), have 
had to leave, or may have to leave their countries of residence 
because of danger to their lives or liberties on account of their 
race, religion, or political beliefs” (Intergovernmental Com-
mittee on Refugees, 1944, authors’ emphasis). The ICGR thus 
acknowledged that return might not be an option for those 
refugees who continue to fear “danger to their lives or liber-
ties” in countries of origin. During the war, the ICGR mainly 
focused on supporting emigration and resettlement of Jewish 
refugees. Indeed, finding countries willing to take refugees was 
the primary aim of the agency, as a corollary only including 
(potential) receiving states as its members (Warren, 1958,  
p. 113). After the war, it started to engage in resettlement more 
generally, starting with a limited skills-based resettlement 
scheme for displaced persons to Latin America, while also 
financially supporting displaced persons in their emigration 
(Warren, 1958, p. 114). 
5 The original mandate of the organisation to negotiate the departure of Ger-
man Jews with Nazi Germany and find countries that would accept them soon 
proved to be impossible, both because Nazi Germany was not really open to 
negotiations and few countries were willing to accept refugees (cf. Warren, 
1958).
Gatrell arrives at a total figure of some 175 million displaced in 
the aftermath of World War II, including some 20 million in 
South Asia, 90 million in China and one million in the Middle  
East, most of whom, however, were not considered refugees in 
the emerging legal sense as defined by mandates of different in-
ternational agencies such as the Intergovernmental Committee 
on Refugees (IGCR), the United Nations Relief and Rehabil-
itation Administration (UNRRA), the International Refugee 
Organization (IRO) and the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). 
In proportional terms, (measured) displacement thus never 
was higher than after World War II, with some 7.6 per cent of 
the then global population being displaced. By comparison, in 
the aftermath of the Cold War (average 1992–1996), the share 
of all displaced (including refugees and IDPs) stood at some 0.9 
per cent and has since only increased slightly—to some 0.93 
per cent by 2018 (own calculation based on UNHCR, 2019 and 
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division, 2019). For the aftermath of World War I, 
no comparable figures are available, not only since statistical 
reporting systems in many of the non-European, largely 
colonial countries were less developed and reliable, but because 
dominant ideologies of colonial rule and the self-perception 
of colonial powers as “harbinger of peace after chaos” (Bilger 
& Kraler, 2005, p. 8) arguably conceptually excluded the 
existence of refugees.
In their preparations for the post-War arrangements, the Allied 
Forces saw assistance to displaced populations as a key priority 
and as a central building block of the relief efforts channelled 
through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminis-
tration (UNRRA, 1943–1947). The most significant change in 
comparison to the interwar period was a shift towards a refugee 
definition that was both universal and based on individual 
characteristics4  thus departing from the ad hoc and selective 
arrangements for particular groups that had characterised the 
interwar refugee regime. The key concept that guided UNRRA’s 
relief effort was the comprehensive although at the same time 
quite unspecific term “displaced persons”, defined as “civilians 
outside the national boundaries of their country by reason of the 
war, who are desirous but are unable to return to their home or 
find homes without assistance” (Proudfoot, 1957; quoted after 
Gatrell, 2015, p. 95). 
4 The origins of a universal definition based on individual reasons to leave a 
country can be traced back to the redefinition of the mandate of the Inter-
governmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) in August of 1944. Already a 
year earlier, Herbert Emerson, the League of Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees during the war and simultaneously the ICGR’s Director since 1939 
had used similar terms when describing the longer-term challenge of resolving 
the post-War refugee problem in an article in Foreign Affairs (Emerson, 1943; 
on the IGCR more generally see Holborn, 1975, pp. 18–19).
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1.1.4  Anchoring durable solutions in individual 
rights: The Geneva Refugee Convention
The Geneva Refugee Convention represented a decisive shift 
towards anchoring solutions for refugees in human rights, a 
shift anticipated by the earlier inclusion of a right to asylum 
from persecution in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948, which in turn reflects both the lessons 
learnt from the tragic absence of asylum during World War II  
as well as increasing criticism of practices of forcible return  
and return to potential harm concerning returnees to Soviet- 
controlled countries (Ther, 2017, pp. 142–145). 
Building on the refugee definition of the IRO constitution, both 
the UNHCR Statute and the Geneva Convention included a 
universal definition of refugees. However, there was consid-
erable resistance to a genuine universalisation of the refugee 
definition. The reasons behind this are complex. The geo-
graphical and temporal restrictions concerning the scope of the 
Geneva Refugee Convention clearly reflected major concerns 
in particular by Western states to commit to potentially risky 
commitments and to avoid signing a ‘blank cheque’ for the 
admission of refugees (Wagner & Kraler, 2016, p. 5). At the 
time, non-European parties to the Convention such as Lebanon 
promoted a truly universal definition and a universal scope of 
the refugee convention (Janmyr, 2017), and only disengaged 
from the process as it became clear that the majority of negoti-
ating states preferred to limit it to Europe geographically and to 
the post-War displacement in a temporal perspective. On a legal 
front, IRO lawyers argued in internal discussions that even 
though Palestinian refugees did not match the IRO’s formulation 
of “fear of persecution” the fact that they were willing but unable 
to return did qualify them as refugees (Gatrell, 2015, p. 130). 
Yet as Gatrell (2015) notes, these discussions never saw the 
“light of the day and the IRO and the UN resolved instead to 
concentrate on material assistance”. Ultimately, the Geneva 
Refugee Convention (GRC) thus turned into a regional, Euro-
pean instrument to deal with the post-War European crisis of 
displacement, although clad in a universal language and thus 
containing the seed of its extension to other situations. 
Significantly, the rights granted to recognised refugees appear 
as key elements of a solution to “the social and humanitarian 
problem of refugees” (Preamble, GRC). Apart from their in-
trinsic value, the rights contained in the GRC are instrumental 
in enabling refugees to “lead normal lives” (UNHCR, 2005), 
that is a self-determined life without recourse to assistance. 
As Bradley, Milner and Peruniak (2019, p. 5) suggest, durable 
solutions in this context can be defined as “restoring (or freshly 
establishing) [refugees’] ability to make effective citizenship 
claims, whether through the reassertion of citizenship rights in 
the country of origin upon return or through the acquisition of 
new citizenship rights in a host or resettlement state”. Durable 
solutions in this perspective are as much about basic precondi-
Resettlement later became the main task of the International 
Refugee Organization (IRO). Established in 1947 as a tem-
porary UN agency, the IRO replaced the ICGR as well as 
UNRRA combining the two organisations’ operational foci on 
repatriation and resettlement. The Soviet Union and its allies 
opposed the creation of the IRO and the related shift towards 
resettlement, which in turn was the main reason why the United 
States lobbied for its creation and the suspension of UNRRA, 
of whose budget it provided some 70 per cent (Loescher, 1993, 
p. 49). Local integration, by contrast, was considered only for a 
“residual category unable to emigrate” (Holborn, 1975, p. 35). 
In total, one million displaced persons were resettled in the four 
years of the IRO’s existence between 1947 and 1951 (UNHCR, 
2000, p. 17), as opposed to only some 73,000 persons who 
were returned under the IRO (see Figure 2). Significantly, some 
650,000 displaced persons refused to return in the same period 
(Gatrell, 2015, p. 97). Resettlement thus clearly was the main 
solution pursued during this period. The IRO’s success, how-
ever, was largely made possible by a significant change in US 
policy which considerably increased quotas for migrants from 
central and eastern Europe and the reservation of a large share 
of the quotas for displaced persons (Holborn, 1975, p. 34). 
The 500,000 or so remaining displaced persons in 1951 were 
considered unfit for labour migration programmes of countries 
of immigration which were increasingly looking for candidates 
to emigration from the native, instead of the refugee population 
(Warren, 1958, p. 116). 
Like in the case of the ICGR, the IRO’s constitution made ref-
erence to persecution grounds in a formulation that was already 
very close to the final refugee definition included in UNHCR’s 
statutes adopted in 1950 and the Geneva Refugee Convention 
adopted a year later (UNHCR, 2010; United Nations, 1946; 
United Nations General Assembly, 1950). In part because of US 
frustration over high costs of IRO operations and the perception 
that the IRO risked making the refugee problem “an indefinite 
responsibility of overseas resettlement countries” (Loescher, 
1993, p. 53), the United States started to lobby for a new, small, 
and non-operational agency to be created early on, what was to 
become the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
The IRO’s operational activities as regards resettlement—and 
to a much lesser extent, repatriation—were taken over by the 
Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement 
of Migrants from Europe (PICMME) established in late 1951. 
PICMME was later renamed into the Intergovernmental Com-
mittee for Migration, and in 1989, into the International Organ-
ization for Migration. Between February 1952 and December 
1957, PICMME supported the emigration of 724,031 migrants, 
of whom one-third were refugees (Warren, 1958, p. 117) (see 
Figure 2). 
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ation and resettlement and does not promote either of these as a 
solution. It is thus more concerned with the quality of protection, 
that is which rights should be enjoyed by refugees, than practi-
cally establishing how these should be achieved, suggesting a 
certain tension between the rights-based perspective of the GCR 
and political strategies to fi nd solutions to displacement.  
UNHCR’s statute is more specifi c, specifying that the offi  ce 
should “seek (...) permanent solutions for the problem of refu-
gees by assisting Governments (...) to facilitate the voluntary 
repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new 
national communities” (United Nations General Assembly, 
1950, authors’ emphasis). Not unlike under the IRO, “assim-
ilation within new national communities” initially seems to 
have been primarily understood as referring to integration in a 
resettlement context. At the same time, it became quickly clear 
that resettlement and repatriation would not work for all refu-
gees under UNHCR’s mandate. In his report on the fi rst year of 
UNHCR, High Commissioner Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart 
thus noted that “if a substantial number of the refugees within 
my mandate cannot be voluntarily repatriated or resettled, then 
it seems to me that my chief task must be, in countries where 
this is feasible, to assist the local settlement of those refugees” 
(UNHCR, 1952, para 21). 
In subsequent reports and documents, the three avenues for 
solutions regularly appear together in the same documents, 
while a General Assembly resolution of 1953 for the fi rst time 
refers to the three as equal options, appealing to states to “in-
tensify their eff orts to promote, in co-operation with the High 
Commissioner, solutions for the problems of refugees, through 
repatriation, resettlement and integration (United Nations 
General Assembly, 1953, para 2). 
tions for the enjoyment of other rights as about concrete rights. 
According to Ager and Strang’s argument in their analytical 
framework of integration (2008), these basic human rights 
and citizenship can also be considered as the “foundations” of 
integration.6  
Origins of the concept of durable soluti ons
Today, “durable solutions” are commonly understood as mecha-
nisms that ensure access to the protection and rights aff orded by 
the GRC and represented by the conventional triad of repatria-
tion, local integration and resettlement. The origins of both the 
term and the triad are, however, not entirely clear.
In the interwar years, the term ‘solutions’ seems to have been 
occasionally used, but not in any systematic manner (cf. Skran 
& Daughtry, 2007, p. 16 referring to Simpson’s [1939] study 
of refugees). In his elaborations on the likely solutions to the 
post-war refugee problem, the League of Nations’ High Com-
missioner for Refugees and Director of the ICGR, Herbert Em-
erson (1943), does not use the word ‘solution’ but suggests two 
basic solutions, namely repatriation and settlement, irrespective 
of where settlement takes place. Importantly, he suggests that 
the latter may be required in particular in respect to what he 
calls “long-term refugees”, namely a person “who is unable 
to return to his own country and to enjoy there the protection 
of his government” because of “political, racial or religious 
persecution” or changed boundaries and resulting statelessness, 
causes that he considered likely to persist (Emerson, 1943, 
p. 213). He distinguishes these from short-term refugees, that 
is war refugees, fl eeing immediate danger to their lives. 
Mirroring Emerson’s views on solutions, a French draft resolu-
tion on the establishment of a UN High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees of November 1949, speaking of “fi nal solutions on [sic] 
the problem of refugees” distinguishes between repatriation 
and national assimilation, without specifying where this should 
occur (United Nations General Assembly, 1949). 
It seems that in the Constitution of the IRO the distinction be-
tween repatriation, “re-establishment in the country of temporary 
residence” and “re-settlement and re-establishment” in other 
countries is made fi rst, although it further distinguishes between 
other countries to which refugees have family ties and those 
where this is not the case (United Nations, 1946, Article 2, lit b). 
The GRC itself does not systematically refer to solutions, al-
though Article 34 calls on states to “as far as possible facilitate 
the assimilation and naturalization of refugees”, thus to promote 
local integration in name only. It only indirectly refers to repatri-
6 Ager and Strang (2008, p. 170, Figure 1) further disti nguish the dimensions 
“facilitators” (language, cultural knowledge and safety), “social connecti ons 
(social bridges, social bonds and social links), and “markers and means” (em-
ployment, housing, educati on, health)”.
Figure 1: No. of documents found at REFWORLD related to 
durable soluti ons and protracted displacement, 1970–2016
Source: own presentati on, based on search on Refworld; Note: Aft er 2016, 
there is a considerable decline of results for both durable soluti ons and 
protracted displacement, which may result from delayed posti ngs of docu-
ments on Reliefweb. This period has thus been excluded. More generally, 
frequency counts based on bibliographical or documentary databases need 
to be treated with cauti on given the signifi cant rise of deposited docu-
ments with the onset of routi ne online disseminati on in the late 1990s.
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The term ‘durable solutions’ seems to have been sparingly used 
at best during the 1960s and early 1970s, but has increasingly 
replaced other expressions (such as ‘permanent solutions’ or 
‘solutions for the problem of refugees’ as in the preceding 
quote) during the second half the 1970s, although it was not 
always used as a synonym (cf. Figure 1, below). Thus, in a 
report to the UN General Assembly of 1975 (UNHCR, 1975), 
the term ‘durable’ is used as a less definitive alternative to 
‘permanent solutions’ referred to a couple of times in the same 
text. The understanding of ‘durable’ or ‘permanent solutions’, 
however, remained relatively flexible. Louise Holborn, the 
author of the first major work on the history and activities of the 
UNHCR in the first two-and-a-half decades after World War 
II, thus spends most of her chapter on ‘permanent solutions’ in 
Africa on local settlement policies and education. While both 
of these are associated with the notion of local integration, they 
are not synonymous (cf. Holborn, 1975, pp. 899-955).
The number of UNHCR documents that use the term ‘durable 
solutions’ starts to increase (although at a low overall scale) as 
of 1979 (see Figure 1), several of which are in connection to the 
1979 Meeting on Refugees and displaced persons in South-East 
Asia, convened by the UN Secretary-General and leading to a 
first massive resettlement effort for Indo-Chinese refugees (see 
on the development of solutions for South-East Asian refugees 
Mathew & Harley, 2016, pp. 143–161). 
The establishment of a UNHCR fund for durable solutions 
(UNHCR, 1980, p. 20) appears to have been an important step 
in normalising the term. For instance, a UNHCR report on 
temporary asylum issued one year later (UNHCR, 1981) uses 
the term ‘durable solution’ as a standard technical term. By 
the mid-1980s, the term and its understanding (as a short-hand 
reference to repatriation, local integration and resettlement to 
a third country) seems to have become consolidated, which is 
also reflected in an increasing use in the academic literature (cf. 
Stein, 1986; see Figure 1).
1.1.5  The shifting weight of individual durable 
solutions
In summary, the conventional understanding of  ‘durable solutions’ 
has emerged in UNHCR’s and refugee experts’ active normative 
reflections about and canonisation of practices, diverse tactics, 
strategies and longer-term visions on finding solutions to equally  
diverse ‘refugee problems’, adapting these reflections to constantly 
changing political circumstances. 
The conventional solutions—repatriation, local integration and 
resettlement—reflect the non-political, humanitarian self-under-
standing of UNHCR—and those of many refugee experts. As Katy 
Long (2014, p. 477) has critically remarked, the durable solutions 
framework thus tends to “focus on the physical symptoms of 
displacement rather than the political causes” while failing “to 
engage with broader development issues in refugee-producing and 
refugee-hosting regions.”  What is more, the institutionalisation 
of the ‘durable solutions’ paradigm has gone along with a strictly 
territorial and nation-state based understanding of how ‘solutions’ 
to displacement should look like, and  ’fixing’ the problem of 
refugees in certain places and thus also “’fixing’ people in places” 
(Long, 2014, p. 277; see Harvey, 1999 for a related discussion 
of ‘spatial fixes’).7  What is clear is that there is a stark contrast 
between the contemporary understanding of refugee status as a 
sort of territorially anchored surrogate citizenship and equipping 
refugees with the ‘legitimate means of movement’ (Torpey, 1998) 
as the dominant approach in the interwar period. 
The weight of individual ‘durable solutions’ has shifted markedly 
over the years. While local integration and resettlement had been 
the main strategies pursued from the 1950s to the 1980s (see on 
resettlement, Figure 2, below), repatriation (re-) entered the dis-
cussions in the early 1980s after UNHCR’s Executive Committee 
endorsed voluntary repatriation as the most desirable durable 
solution in its 1983 session (Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Programme, 1983) and UNHCR got involved in a 
number of not always entirely voluntary repatriation efforts in the 
African context (Harrell-Bond, 1989). 
The political preference towards resettlement and local inte-
gration in the first 30 years of UNHCR’s existence and the shift 
towards return reflect both political preferences of key states as 
well as wider opportunities or constraints. Thus, resettlement 
would not have played such a role after World War II had there 
not been demand for labour in other European and overseas 
countries of immigration and refugees had not possessed the 
skills required at destination countries. However, the large-
scale resettlement of Indo-Chinese refugees followed a largely 
political rationale, thus departing from the skills-based logic 
dominant in much of the immediate post-war period (cf. Betts, 
2008; Mathew & Harley, 2016).  
In a similar vein, the shift towards repatriation in the African 
context as of the early 1980s signalled the increasing concerns 
of poor receiving states over the development impacts of the 
presence of large numbers of refugees. They were increas-
ingly reluctant to promote local integration, which they also 
articulated at two large conferences on refugees in Africa, the 
International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa 
(ICARA I) in 1981 and ICARA II in 1984 (see in more detail 
below). The explosion of UNHCR’s budget—from US $76 mil-
lion in 1975 to some US $580 million in 1989 (UNHCR, 2000, 
p. 107, pp. 166-167) and a resulting funding crisis (cf. UNHCR, 
1985), however, also contributed to the shift. 
7 We thank Benjamin Etzold and Ferruccio Pastore for the insight and the 
 formulation.
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1.2  The origins of the debate on protracted 
refugee situations 
1.2.1  Refugees, development and the lack of  
durable solutions
As argued in the preceding sections, to address protracted 
displacement situations has arguably been a major raison d’être 
of the international refugee protection regime from the League 
of Nations onwards. However, from about the 1980s, the rising 
numbers of refugees in situations of long-term exile, without 
a realistic prospect of finding a solution and often contained 
in organised settlements or camps in peripheral regions and 
provided with care and maintenance (Milner & Loescher, 2011, 
p. 7) gave rise to a specific debate and the development of the 
concept of protracted displacement. 
In particular, refugee situations in Africa and to a lesser extent 
in Asia and Latin America have been influential in shaping the 
debates on protracted displacement. A report on organised ref-
ugee settlements in Africa—where some 96 per cent of all or-
ganised settlement schemes were located (Clark & Stein, 1985, 
p. 2)—noted a proliferation of camps and organised settlements. 
It was believed that it would be easier to access and organise 
international assistance and to better control displaced popula-
tions in such settlements. The report estimated that about half 
of Africa’s refugees at the time were self-settled, about one-
quarter accommodated in emergency camps targeting newly 
arrived refugees and another quarter in organised settlements. 
Of the 107 settlements that were counted and established before 
1982, only 30 had attained self-sufficiency (Clark & Stein, 1985, 
pp. 2; 23). This pointed to a high degree of extended reliance on 
external aid. Nevertheless, the report embraces organised set-
tlements as an instrument of choice to promote local integration 
and advocated a series of measures to improve the inhabitants’ 
self-sufficiency. 
While the general focus of these earlier debates was set on as-
sisted refugees in camps (see Freund & Kalumba, 1986 for one 
of the few studies at the time of self-settled refugees), there was 
a wider realisation of the link between the ‘massive arrivals’ of 
refugees in low-income countries and the lack of durable solu-
tions (Stein, 1986, p. 264). Several international conferences 
focusing on refugees in Africa, whose lessons, however, were 
taken up elsewhere, such as the 1979 Pan-African Conference 
on the Situation of Refugees in Africa and two donor confer-
ences—the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees 
in Africa (ICARA I) in 1981 and a second international confer-
ence on refugees in Africa in 1984 (ICARA II), have helped to 
put this link on the international agenda. 
It was only during the 1990s, when a variety of protracted proxy 
wars and related situations of mass displacement came to an 
end in the context of the end of Cold War that repatriation be-
came a desirable and a realistic option in several displacement 
situations. Repatriation shaped and was shaped by the experi-
ence of several large-scale return operations in Latin America 
and Africa, and to a lesser extent in Asia. In these contexts, 
return was often also seen as part and parcel of post-conflict 
reconstruction and peacebuilding that corresponded to prefer-
ences and aspirations of individual refugees (cf. Black & Koser, 
1999). Against this background, the then High Commissioner 
Sadako Ogata optimistically declared the 1990s a “decade of 
repatriation” (Ogata, 1992). Within a few years, however, a  
benign form of promoting (voluntary) return made way for a 
more repressive approach, when countries of the Global North 
and key states in the Global South adopted harsher return 
policies and increasingly promoted return to volatile situations, 
even using coercive means (Chimni, 2004; Hammond, 2014). 
At the same time, the exceptionally high numbers of repatri-
ations in the early 1990s—some 12 million people (Koser & 
Black, 1999, p. 3)—had a limited impact on overall refugee 
numbers as many other refugee situations remained unchanged 
or were fuelled by new arrivals, while new conflicts led to fresh 
displacement. As Loescher (1993, p. 90-91) noted, at the time, 
“the magnitude of the [refugee] problem was such that the insti-
tutional constraints on repatriation, local settlement and reset-
tlement were quickly revealed (…) [a]nd as a result, the majority 
of the world’s refugees were given temporary asylum in camps 
with no prospect of effective long-term solutions”—a problem 
description very similar to that of UNHCR that described the 
problem of “protracted refugee situations” about a decade later. 
In the next section, we trace the origins and the evolution of the 
debate on protracted displacement in more detail. 
Figure 2: Selected historical instances of large scale resettlement
Sources: Data for resettled refugees under the IRO drawn from UNHCR 
(2000, p. 17), for refugees resettled under ICEM between 1952 and 1957 
from Warren (1958, p. 117), data for Indochinese refugees drawn from 
UNHCR (2000, p. 99); data for Syrians drawn from the UNHCR statistical 
database on resettlement data. Note: in thousands.
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In his comparison of different ‘comprehensive plans of action’ 
(CPAs), Betts compares the largely failed ICARA process 
to the comparatively much more successful Conference on 
Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) and the Indo-Chinese 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (both of 1989), noting that the 
latter built on political engagement as a key principle, striving 
for “political agreement between a range of governmental and 
non-governmental stakeholders, and including, but not being 
confined to, addressing the refugee issue”, whereas he describes 
ICARA “as a technical process of identifying projects that 
address the situation of the displaced, compiling them into 
programmatic areas and seeking funding for them through a 
pledging conference (Betts, 2008, pp. 163–164).
Following the emergence of a series of conflicts in Somalia, 
Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire/the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and related massive displacement after 1990s, even more 
emphasis was put on humanitarian assistance as opposed to 
long term development and durable, or at least temporary, solu-
tions already apparent in the 1980s (see UNHCR, 2006, p. 105). 
As a result, in situations where repatriation was not feasible, 
containment rather than local integration became endorsed 
as the new gold standard of refugee policies in many African 
receiving states. The Dadaab refugee camps in northeastern 
Kenya that were established to accommodate hundreds of thou-
sands of Somali refugees fleeing the violent collapse of the Siad 
Barre regime in 1991 became a prime example of encampment 
without local integration. 
As Hyndman and Giles (2016) have observed, refugees in these 
contexts may be protected from return (refoulement), but enjoy 
few if any of the social rights enshrined in the Geneva Refugee 
Convention and are thus thrown back to a position of ‘bare life’. 
Hyndman and Giles relate the minimalist provision of rights to 
refugees in these camps to the prima facie status of refugees, 
i.e. the determination of a refugee status on a group basis rather 
than an individual decision, as indeed has the majority of ref-
ugees worldwide.8  Joël Glasman (2017, p. 343-344) traces the 
use of the prima facie concept back to the origins of UNHCR’s 
involvement in the African context in the early 1960s and the 
parallel elaboration of the ‘good office doctrine’, through which 
UNHCR expanded its role beyond its original European focus. 
At the time, UNHCR regarded individual status assessment as 
too difficult—and unnecessary: As High Commissioner Felix 
Schnyder argued in a statement before the UNHCR Executive 
Committee in 1961, “(…) the problem raised by the new groups 
of refugees (…) is essentially, at the moment, a problem of 
material assistance and not of legal protection” (Glasman, 2017, 
p. 356).
8 Hyndman and Giles (2016, p. 10), quoting an UNHCR report from 2012, report 
that an estimated four out of five refugees were “prima facie” refugees.
ICARA I and II largely did so by pointing at the ‘burdens’ 
which the large-scale presence of refugees presented to re-
ceiving states, calling for more support to African host states 
and more development as opposed to emergency aid-oriented 
programming (Gorman, 1986). The resulting strategy of ‘ref-
ugee aid and development’ (RAD) was based on the belief “that 
assistance should be development-oriented from the outset and 
thereby enable beneficiaries to move quickly towards self-suf-
ficiency”. Furthermore, the strategy also “emphasised the need 
for a focus on refugee-populated areas” (Crisp, 2001, p. 171), 
in a way resuscitating earlier ideas of “zonal development” in a 
refugee context (Betts, 1969). 
As Mathew and Harley (2016) argued, conference participants, 
of which, in particular, African states as its main stakeholders, 
sought to prevent the permanent settlement of refugees on their 
territory, in other words, eschew local integration as a durable 
solution. As Kibreab (1989) had earlier noted, local settle-
ments—a policy pursued by many African states before the 
shift towards camp-like structures in the mid-1980s onwards 
and widely debated as a policy to promote ‘local integration’—
are better understood as a temporary tool aimed at helping 
refugees gain self-reliance and thus reduce aid dependency. 
But local settlement policies never really aimed at integration. 
As Clark and Stein’s study (1985) suggests, the success of local 
settlement policies in promoting self-sufficiency was rather 
modest. In her provocatively titled study “Imposing Aid”, Bar-
bara Harrel-Bond (1986) went a step further, arguing that the 
policy may have been misconceived from the outset and been 
culpable of contributing to aid dependency, mainly because of 
the top-down and technocratic manner local settlement policies 
were implemented and the failure to give refugees a say in the 
planning, design and management of settlements. 
A subsequent report commissioned by UNHCR (Stein, 1994) 
observed that the ‘refugees and development’ approach 
endorsed by ICARA II was not only relatively unsuccessful 
in terms of soliciting additional funding for rather ambitious 
development programmes, but also somewhat ambivalent in 
terms of what it wanted to achieve for refugees. Thus, while 
the resulting declaration and plan of action endorsed durable 
solutions in principle (albeit establishing a clear preference 
for return), it went on to state that “where voluntary return 
is not immediately feasible, conditions should be created in 
the country of asylum for temporary settlement” that do “not 
necessarily imply a commitment to one or another long-term 
solution” (ICARA II Principles of Action, quoted after Stein, 
1994, para 15). As succinctly summarized by Crisp (2001, p. 172) 
the Refugees and Development approach thus was palliative—it 
was to somehow “ameliorate the situation of refugees, the host 
community and state, pending the day when those refugees 
returned to their country of origin”, rather than to provide 
solutions. 
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tions) and, for the first time, seems to have been used as a de-
scription for a specific challenge arising from the combination 
of the scale of the problem (large scale refugee situations) and 
the duration of such situations in a note submitted by the then 
High Commissioner Sadako Ogata in 1992 to the Economic and 
Social Council of the General Assembly (UNHCR, 1992). 
The UNHCR study informed the definition of protracted 
refugee situation subsequently adopted by a UNHCR Executive 
Committee discussion paper in 2004 (UNHCR, 2004, p. 2), 
which later became the official UNHCR definition of protracted 
refugee situations. The paper defined a protracted refugee 
situation
as one in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting 
and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at 
risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social 
and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years 
in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to 
break free from enforced reliance on external assistance 
(UNHCR, 2004, p. 2). 
Taking up the time criterion adopted by the earlier study and 
adding a numerical threshold reflecting the primary focus on 
situations of (past) mass arrivals, the paper advanced a separate 
definition for statistical purposes, stressing the duration of 
displacement over the qualitative features of protracted dis-
placement and defining it as “as one in which 25,000 or more 
refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five 
consecutive years or more in developing countries” (UNHCR, 
2004, p. 2). Conceptually, however, and as stressed by the 
conceptualisation of protracted refugee situations adopted by 
UNHCR’s earlier study (Crisp, 2003) it is the inaccessibility of 
durable solutions rather than the duration of exile that arguably 
is the defining criterion of protracted refugee situations (see 
also Etzold et al., 2019).
A following major study on protracted refugee situations 
conducted by Gil Loescher and James Milner at the Refugee 
Studies Centre in Oxford (Loescher & Milner, 2005) rightly 
criticises the static conception of UNHCR’s definition, arguing 
that the conceptualisation fails to capture the fluidity of 
protracted refugee situations. They note, for instance, that the 
relatively stable figures of Burundian refugees in Tanzania in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s conceal significant movements 
in and out of Tanzania (p. 14). (For a more general discussion 
of statistics on the duration of international displacement, see 
Devictor & Do, 2016.) They also note that the static focus on 
a state of deprivation insufficiently acknowledges how refu-
Even though the universalisation of the Geneva Refugee Con-
vention through its 1967 Protocol theoretically included ‘new 
refugees’ under the international protection regime, the distinc-
tion between refugees requiring protection and those requiring 
humanitarian aid persisted, creating what Aleinikoff and 
Zamore (2019) have called a “bifurcation of the global refugee 
regime”. Resettlement in that context never appeared to have 
been seriously on the agenda, unlike in the European context 
in the post-World War II era (cf. Holborn, 1975, pp. 836–838). 
As Sandvik (2010) shows in the case of African refugees, there 
was a ‘renewal and reform’ of resettlement in the course of the 
1990s. Only with the shift towards vulnerability as the main 
criterion for resettlement, resettlement became an option for a 
significant number of African refugees for the first time. 
1.2.2  Arriving at a definition 
It is against the background of the shift away from local in-
tegration to containment—a spatial fix (Harvey, 1999)—that 
UNHCR and other actors came to name and study ‘protracted 
refugee situations’ in the early 2000s, putting the situation 
of refugees in extended exile on the agenda in a systematic 
manner for the first time (see Chimni, 2004; Hyndman & Giles, 
2016; Jacobsen, 2001; Rutinwa, 2002 on the trend towards 
containment).9  The main impetus came from a study conducted 
by UNHCR’s then newly established Evaluation and Policy Unit 
(EPAU, subsequently renamed into Research and Evaluation 
Unit) with support from the US Department of State’s Bureau 
for Population, Refugees and Migration between 2001 and 2002 
(Crisp, 2003). 
The study regarded refugees “as being in a protracted situation 
when they have lived in exile for more than five years, and 
when they still ha[d] no immediate prospect of finding a durable 
solution to their plight by means of voluntary repatriation, local 
integration, or resettlement” (Crisp, 2003, p. 1). Employing this 
definition, the study examined protracted refugee situations in 
Africa. It identified protracted conflicts and continued massive 
human rights abuses in countries of origin, a lack of attention 
and willingness to invest in local integration and a prioritisation 
of return and the fact that refugees in protracted situations often 
were ‘residual caseloads’ or had become political hostages in 
dealings between host and origin countries as key factors in the 
emergence and persistence of protracted refugee situations.
The term ‘protracted refugee situation’ itself seems to have 
been in use within UNHCR longer (see Figure 1, p. 9). It appears 
infrequently in UNHCR documents from about the mid-1980s 
onwards (cf. UNHCR, 1985, para 24, for one of the first men-
9 As Kibreab’s analysis of local settlement policies (1989) suggests, this shift 
does not constitute a major break with previous policies, but merely articu-
lated the preference of seeing refugees’ presence as temporary more clearly, 
whereas local settlement policies were more ambivalent in this regard.
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1.3  Summary: Durable solutions, protracted  
displacement and the evolution of the international 
refugee protection regime
As the preceding two sections have shown, the search for solu-
tions for longer-term refugee situations has been a key driver 
for the evolution of the international refugee protection regime 
from its very beginnings under the League of Nations. The 
emergence of protracted displacement as a specific challenge 
to policy, however, is a consequence of a series of interrelated 
developments that occurred later. These included the globali-
sation of the international refugee protection regime in the 
1960s and 1970s, the growth of the global refugee population 
and the changing availability of classical durable solutions to 
these new refugee populations. The latter was exacerbated by 
the non-availability of resettlement through regular legal mi-
gration routes for most non-European refugees and the highly 
selective availability of alternative avenues to resettlement, the 
gees have sought and found their own solutions to protracted 
displacement. Despite this criticism, however, the concept of 
protracted displacement (or more narrowly defined: protracted 
refugee situations) has been widely taken up both in academic 
and policy debates to their mutual benefit.10  
While protacted displacement initially only received attention 
as a cross-border issue, reflecting the origin of these debates 
within UNHCR, the latter’s institutional mandate and the fact 
that internally displaced persons (IDPs) only slowly attained 
more systematic international attention, there has since been 
considerable work on protracted displacement in the context 
of internal displacement (Bradley, 2018; IASC, 2010; Kälin & 
Entwisle Chapuisat, 2017, 2018), further consolidating the con-
cept of ‘protracted displacement’ as a policy and an analytical 
category (see also Etzold et al., 2019). 
10 The chapter on Protracted Refugee Situations in UNHCR’s flagship publication 
“The State of the World’s Refugees 2006”, for example, was authored by Gil 
Loescher and James Milner (UNHCR, 2006).
As the concept of protracted displacement is relatively recent and because it was developed in the context of longer-standing debates on 
durable solutions in developing countries, it is no surprise that there has been not much of a debate on protracted displacement in the 
European context, and specifically that of the European Union.
At the same time and as analysed above, the displacement crisis in Europe after World War II can be described as a protracted dis-
placement situation that policymakers at the time tried hard to address. The Geneva Refugee Convention in this context can be seen 
as a structural response to massive and extended displacement, not least by defining refugees’ rights and thus the content of ‘durable 
solutions’. 
However, the Geneva Convention left two issues relevant to protracted displacement unaddressed: 
• There is a gap between the (narrow) persecution grounds defined by the Convention and the wider non-refoulement prin-
ciple. This gap gave rise to the category of ‘de facto refugees’, that is individuals who were unable or unwilling to return to 
their country of citizenship because of fear of serious harm, but who did not meet the criteria of the refugee definition of the 
Convention, and as a result lacked a clear legal status (Paludan, 1981);
• The absence of rules on access to protection also means that no rules were set on which a state would be responsible for 
determining a person’s claim to refugee status. In the European context, this led to a phenomenon discussed as ‘refugees 
in orbit’, that is asylum applicants who did not submit claims in the first country of arrival but elsewhere or who submitted 
claims in more than one member state and who were often passed from one to another as no state assumed responsibility to 
deal with the case (Bacardi, 2002; Loescher, 1989; Paludan, 1981). 
Both issues were addressed when the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was developed. In particular, the issue of secondary 
movements and absence of rules on responsibility for determining the status of refugees was a key driver for the development of the 
CEAS in the form of the Dublin Convention that was closely linked to the Schengen Agreement (cf. Noll, 2000). Both regulations were 
in place even before the European Union formally acquired a legal competence in policymaking in the field of migration and asylum. 
The problem of ‘de facto refugees’ was addressed by the introduction of ‘subsidiary protection’ as a legal status with associated rights 
(instead of simple protection from expulsion with unclear legal status and access to other rights). Like the Geneva Refugee Convention 
before it, the CEAS can, therefore, be regarded as a structural response to protracted displacement, even if its empirical record in 
achieving these aims is an altogether different matter (cf.  Ferreira et al., 2020).
Box 1: Protracted displacement and the development of European refugee law
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increasing reluctance of main receiving countries in the Global 
South to provide more than temporary solutions for refugees 
and the increasing funding challenges faced by UNHCR and 
other agencies to finance ‘care and maintenance’ of refugees 
in situations of long term exile. The brief historical review 
undertaken here suggests two main conclusions: First, what 
emerged as vague and non-standardised pathways for resolving 
the situation of particular lots of refugees has narrowed down 
to a more limited range of ‘durable solutions’ accessible only 
to a minority of displaced persons and resulting in a significant 
mismatch between displaced persons’ own aspirations and 
available options. Second, the review of historical responses to 
(protracted) displacement shows that providing opportunities 
for the mobility of refugees has been an essential instrument for 
achieving more durable solutions, even if or perhaps because 
these were often grounded in skills-based or other non-human-
itarian logics. The wide range of opportunities at times offered 
in the past suggests that there is a case for moving active ref-
ugee admission (Welfens, Engler, Garnier, Endres de Oliveira, 
& Kleist, (2019) beyond vulnerability-based cases.  
In the following section, we discuss policy approaches towards 
protracted refugee situations in East Africa, the Horn of Africa, 
the Middle East and South Asia. 
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Other major refugee movements included several waves of Con-
golese refugees in the early and mid-1960s and the late 1970s 
(Fabian, 1996; Freund & Kalumba, 1986; Wiseman, 2019) and 
Ugandan refugees in the wake of Idi Amin’s rule in the 1970s 
but in particular as a consequence of the civil war in the 1980s 
(Allen & Vlassenroot, 2010; Branch, 2011; Crisp, 1986). The 
subsequent conflict in the north of Uganda created both massive 
internal and cross-border displacement (Branch, 2010; Kwaks, 
2018). Following the 1972 genocide in Burundi perpetrated by 
the extremist minority Tutsi regime against Hutu elites, a large 
proportion of Burundian Hutus fled to Tanzania (Kibreab, 2014; 
Malkki, 1995b). Repeated instances of massacres and (ethni-
cised) violence in 1988 and 1993 led to further displacement 
of refugees. It is, in particular, the response to the (long-term) 
presence of Burundian refugees that will serve as a case study 
for the subsequent section. 
2.1.2  General policy approaches
Both Tanzania and Uganda, the main receiving countries 
considered in this section, generally pursued an open-door 
policy towards refugees until the late 1980s. Some refugee 
groups, such as refugees from southern Africa (Mozambique, 
South Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, South Africa) who were considered 
freedom fighters received also political and military support. 
As reasons for displacement changed and numbers of refugees 
grew in the 1980s, there has been a gradual shift towards en-
campment. A major change of approach only occurred with the 
onset of multiple crises in the Great Lakes, involving displace-
ment from Burundi in the early 1990s and especially Rwanda 
after the 1994 genocide. This engendered a marked securiti-
sation of refugee policies (Wilson & Kwaks, 2019), although 
overall policies remained relatively liberal and welcoming. In 
the following, Tanzania’s responses to long-term refugee situa-
tions will be discussed in more detail. 
2.1.3  Tanzania’s responses to long-term refugee 
situations
Within East Africa, Tanzania is considered to be a stable 
country, a heaven of peace by many potential migrants and 
refugees until today (Perullo, 2008). This was especially true 
in the first decades after independence. Burundians fleeing 
the 1972 genocide in their country are a case in point. At first 
Burundian Hutus were placed in ‘reception centers’, ‘holding’ 
camps or ‘transit’ camps (Malkki, 1995a, p. 38). But under 
Nyerere, the young socialist nation experimented with Ujamaa, 
Nyerere’s philosophy of African socialism. One of the pillars of 
2.  Responding to protracted  
displacement
In the preceding sections, we have analysed overall approaches 
to (protracted) displacement and the search for durable solu-
tions in a historical perspective. In this section, we zoom in 
into the concrete situation in the four regions covered by the 
TRAFIG project and examine the evolution of policies to-
wards protracted displacement in major host countries of these 
four regions. In doing so, we focus on key policies and policy 
changes in regard to major protracted refugee situations in 
different countries (see Appendix 1 for an overview). 
2.1  East Africa
East Africa has seen several waves of displacement since 
decolonisation in the early 1960s. In the following section, we 
provide a brief sketch of displacement in the region and then 
provide a case study of a policy approach devised to respond to 
(protracted) displacement from Burundi. 
2.1.1  Patterns of displacement in East Africa
The Rwandan revolution and subsequent violent decolonisa-
tion (1959–1962) led to the toppling of the Tutsi-dominated 
monarchy that had been maintained under Belgium’s system of 
indirect rule and the displacement of Tutsis and Hutu royalists 
to the Congo (current DRC), Burundi, Uganda and Tanganyika. 
This first ‘Rwandan crisis’ prompted the first major assistance 
mission of UNHCR in Sub-Saharan Africa and the develop-
ment of a policy of refugee settlements that became a model of 
refugee assistance in the wider African context (Kraler, 2004). 
Return in the case of Rwandan refugees was seen as neither 
desirable nor feasible and was never seriously considered after 
Rwanda achieved independence in June 1962. A consultant for 
an ILO-operated development scheme for Rwandan refugees in 
the Congo and Burundi told conference participants in 1968: 
The general idea followed from the [very] beginning was 
one of actively favoring their [Rwandan refugees’] inte-
gration into the host country, for several reasons. In the 
first place, it seemed that no political or social stability 
could be obtained in Rwanda unless the emigrants [sic!] 
abandoned all hope of return. And for this they had to find 
conditions of living for a possible permanent settlement. 
Rapid integration seemed even more necessary, since 
considerable costs were being supported by [UNHCR] 
and the Red Cross. They had to be reduced as quickly as 
possible (M.P. Ballot, "Les refugiés de Ruanda " Paris 
Symposium, Jan. 1968, quoted and translated in Holborn, 
1975, p. 1084).
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In 2007, the Tanzanian government, in partnership with the 
Burundian government and UNHCR, adopted the Tanzania 
Comprehensive Solutions Strategy (TANCOSS) which outlined 
a plan for durable solutions for the first cohort of Burundian 
refugees who had been in Tanzania since 1972 (Thomson, 
2009; Milner, 2014; Kekic & Mseke, 2016; Kuch, 2016, 2018). 
Initially, TANCOSS included three pillars: Voluntary repa-
triation to Burundi, processing of citizenship applications for 
those who opted for naturalisation in Tanzania and relocation of 
the naturalised refugees from the refugee settlements to other 
regions of Tanzania, including that of Mishamo. While 79 per 
cent of refugees opted for Tanzanian citizenship, 21 per cent 
opted for repatriation. In 2014, the Burundian refugees who 
opted for naturalisation finally received citizenship certificates, 
even though there are still at least 40,000 applications pending, 
and it is unclear how and when they are going to be dealt with 
(Kuch, 2016). 
Despite the encouraging steps adopted by the TANCOSS 
which, according to Kekic and Mseke (2016), could have served 
as a blueprint for expanding the framework of durable solutions 
globally, Tanzania’s stance vis-à-vis refugee integration had 
changed. Just like Ethiopia, Tanzania was to take part in the 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework’s (CRRF) pilot 
programme, but the Tanzanian government decided to with-
draw from it in early 2018, citing security concerns and a lack 
of donor support (Ensor, 2018; Hansen, 2018). In doing so, the 
Tanzanian government ended an ongoing exercise to integrate 
refugees into receiving communities. In addition to this, it also 
stated that it would discourage new asylum applications. More-
over, Human Rights Watch (2019) expressed concerns about 
numerous factors making refugees’ lives difficult. Recently, 
since October 2019, Burundian refugees have been pressured to 
return to their country (RFI, 2019).
2.2  The Horn of Africa
Like East Africa, the Horn of Africa has seen multiple crises 
involving displacement from the 1960s onwards. Displacement 
in the region has been at the centre, and to some extent, at the 
origin of debates on protracted displacment. The adopted en-
campment policies were serving as a frequent reference, if not a 
model, for other situations. 
2.2.1  Patterns of displacement in the Horn of Africa
During the struggles for and after independence (of the former 
colonies in Africa) political domination of one ethnic group 
over another, coups and attempted coups caused displace-
ment in many cases. In the 1960s, the civil war in Sudan, 
which lasted for 17 years (1955–1972), led to massive refugee 
Ujamaa was rural socialism (Raikes, 1975), giving birth to ag-
ricultural and co-operative villages, which were also extended 
to refugees. As Daley (1991) demonstrated, the accommodation 
of Rwandan refugees in the early 1960s and the establishment 
of rural settlements had in fact served as a laboratory to develop 
Ujamaa. 
The 1972 refugee load from Burundi fitted well into this 
agricultural experiment. Tanzania thus gave five hectares per 
family to refugees who had fled the mass killings. Through the 
judicious use of land grants, the refugees transformed their new 
property into some of the most productive in the country (US 
Department of State, 2014, p. 9). Nevertheless, refugees resisted 
resettlement as many had been living in Kigoma villages—in 
Tanzania’s northeast close to Lake Tanganyika—for six or 
seven years and had grown used to life in a town (Malkki, 
1995b, p. 39). 
In the 1970s and 1980s, humanitarian agencies and academics 
often commended Tanzania for its hospitality towards refugees 
(Turner, 2004). Mishamo settlement—south of Kigoma—had 
been, since its establishment, an object of abundant surveying 
and documentation, particularly evident concerning its ag-
ricultural production. Mishamo was considered a successful 
example, a model refugee settlement, a prototype of a new 
generation of refugee settlements (Armstrong, 1987; Malkki, 
1995b, p. 42). A lot has been written about rural encampment 
policies, its success stories and the tripartite agreement between 
the Tanzanian government, UNHCR and the implementing 
agency and non-governmental organisation (NGO) Tanganyika 
Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) (Gasarasi, 1984; Anthony, 
1990; Armstrong, 1990, 1991; Chaulia, 2003). 
Since the 1990s, Tanzania has toughened its policies towards 
refugees, driven by a combination of external and internal fac-
tors. On the one hand, the collapse of the Tanzanian economy, 
the liberalisation programmes and the political reforms in the 
post-Nyerere period played a determinant role in the perception 
of refugees (Van Hoyweghen, 2001). On the other hand, the 
country was overwhelmed by the influx of refugees who en-
tered Tanzania in the mid-1990s. The tougher line was particu-
larly obvious in the forced expulsion of Rwandan refugees in 
December 1996 and January 1997 (Human Rights Watch, 1999; 
Turner, 2004). With the changed perception of refugees and the 
discourse framed in terms of a threat to national security, ref-
ugees were linked to growing crime rates, price hikes, deterio-
rating environmental situations and the saturation of the  
labour market (Nimpuno, 1995; Turner, 2004). In 1995, Tanzania 
ended its open-door policy to refugees (Rutinwa, 1996), which 
led to the stricter 1998 Refugees Act (Kamanga, 2005). This 
securitisation trend continues up until today. 
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result of the conflict, including some 400,000 who went to 
Ethiopia and over 200,000 who went to Kenya (UNHCR, 2000). 
As a result of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, 68,000 
people were expelled to Eritrea for being nationals of an enemy 
state and neither of the two countries was willing to accept full 
responsibility for them as citizens. In 1996, the tensions in the 
Great Lakes also affected the Horn of Africa with deteriorating 
relations between Uganda and Sudan (UNHCR, 2000). By 
1999, Ethiopia was among the main refugee receiving countries 
with nearly 260,000 refugees, including over 180,000 Somalis, 
some 70,000 Sudanese and around 5,000 Kenyan refugees. 
Kenya by that time hosted some 224,000 refugees. The largest 
groups were Somalis (some 140,000) and Sudanese (some 
64,000). 
Sudan hosted over 390,000 refugees, including over 340,000 
Eritreans and some 35,000 Ethiopians. Most of the Eritrean 
refugees had been in Sudan before Eritrea gained independence 
in 1993. Sudan had also produced some 475,000 refugees as a 
result of its long-running civil war(UNHCR, 2000).
2.2.2  General policy approaches in the Horn of 
Africa 
In the Horn of Africa region, several policy approaches have 
emerged to respond to displacement in the short- and longer term. 
All Horn of Africa countries have generally followed encamp-
ment policies, containing refugees in isolated camps with 
long-term care and maintenance since the 1970s/1980s (Samuel 
Hall Consulting, 2014) to respond to the prolonged presence of 
refugees. Most camps are located in rural border areas. Due to 
encampment policies, countries have put in place administra-
tive barriers to restrict mobility. Certain groups were generally 
excluded from mobility restrictions and/or eligible for permits to 
access camps. These groups include South Sudanese refugees 
in Sudan or Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia due to the out-of-
camp scheme established by the government (Samuel Hall 
Consulting, 2014). In Kenya, movement passes are issued to 
those having a “valid reason to travel outside a designated area” 
in Kenya, but the overall number of passes issued is low, and 
no policy or legal guidance exists regarding their issuance (Re-
public of Kenya, 2012). In practice, they have been issued to at-
tend schools, travel for medical reasons or, to a lesser extent, for 
business reasons (NRC, IHRC, 2018). In line with encampment 
and the care-and-maintenance-approach, employment oppor-
tunities have generally been restricted and limited to so-called 
incentive-based employment with NGOs or UNHCR, informal 
day labour or running businesses. With the realisation of the 
long-lasting presence of refugees, humanitarian and development 
actors have started to develop area-based integrated approaches 
and planning that aim to address the needs of refugees, IDPs and 
host communities in joint programmes. The partial shift towards 
integrated approaches shifted the focus to self-reliance of refu-
gees as well as away from the encampment model.
movements, mainly to Uganda, and to internal displacement 
(UNHCR, 2000; Di Bartolomeo, Thaibaut & Perrin, 2012). In 
the early 1960s, the Sudanese military entered border areas 
in Uganda and Ethiopia on several occasions to return ‘their 
refugees’ to Sudan as they believed rebel groups would exploit 
them (and hence benefit from them) (Loescher & Milner, 2005). 
After the end of the war, a large number of refugees returned 
to their country or region of origin (Holborn, 1972; UNHCR, 
2000). In Kenya, Asians were the target for hostile outbreaks 
as they controlled large parts of the economy (UNHCR, 2000). 
Conflicts between Ethiopian forces and separatists in the prov-
ince of Eritrea resulted in an influx of refugees into Sudan from 
the 1960s onwards. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, several large-scale 
displacements took place in the Horn of Africa, caused by a 
renewal of East-West antagonisms, superpower rivalry and ex-
ternal manipulation of civil conflicts and famine. At the end of 
the 1970s, Ethiopians sought refuge in Somalia, and to a smaller 
extent in Djibouti, after Somalia’s troops under President Siad 
Barre invaded the Ogaden region in Ethiopia in 1977. Refugees 
were mainly accommodated in large camps. Further refugee 
movements to Somalia took place between 1984 and 1986; a 
large number also returned to Ethiopia. 
Refugees from Eritrea, before 1993 formally a part of Ethiopia, 
arrived in Sudan as of 1962 because of armed struggles for the 
right to self-determination. Also, refugees from other parts of 
Ethiopia fled to Sudan, escaping from the prolonged revolution 
and the violent and oppressive military regime of Mengistu 
after the overthrow of the autocratic regime of Haile Selassie in 
1974. The number of Ethiopian refugees, mostly from Eritrea, 
in Sudan grew from 200,000 in 1977 to over 400,000 by the 
end of 1978 (when the Ethiopian government started a major 
offensive against Eritrean opposition forces) and grew even 
further in the 1980s. The famine caused 300,000 refugees from 
Ethiopia, the majority from Tigray but also from the Eritrean 
parts, to flee to Sudan between October 1984 and March 1985. 
At that time, the Wad Sherife refugee camp—in eastern Sudan, 
close to today's Eritrean border—with 128,000 refugees was 
one of the largest in the world. While many Tigrayans returned, 
most of the Eritreans had to stay while fighting and continued 
famine in Eritrea led to new influxes of Eritreans into Sudan. 
Caused by the re-outbreak of the war in 1983 in southern 
Sudan between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 
and government forces, many Sudanese fled to the Gambela 
region of Ethiopia. In 1987/88, a large number of Somalis also 
fled to Ethiopia to escape fighting between Somali government 
forces and rebels seeking independence for northwest Somalia 
(UNHCR, 2000).
In the 1990s, intensified conflict in addition to drought and 
famine in Somalia resulted in massive displacement, and by 
mid-1992, some two million people had been displaced as a 
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2.2.4  Ethiopia: Phasing out encampment and  
facilitating access to work
Until 2010, Ethiopia had been following strict encampment 
policies, and refugees were mostly accommodated in 26 camps, 
which were under the protection of the police. At the time of 
writing, Ethiopia hosts refugees from 30 countries of origin; 
the majority are from the three neighbouring countries Eritrea, 
Somalia and South Sudan (UNHCR, 2018a).
From 2010 onwards, the government introduced the “out-of-
camp policy” allowing (only) Eritrean refugees to live in urban 
centres, provided they have the necessary means to support 
themselves. To be able to support themselves, the Eritrean 
refugees must have a guarantor with Ethiopian citizenship, 
who takes on responsibility for their living expenses once they 
are outside the camps. Eritrean refugees were also allowed 
access to higher education. The Ethiopian government justified 
its decision to only apply the scheme to Eritrean refugees by 
their strong cultural links, homogeneity and existing networks 
within Ethiopian society, which makes the relationship with the 
receiving community easier. The government suggested that 
other refugee groups create security risks if the scheme were 
opened up to them (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014).
In 2017, Ethiopia became one of the first countries to pilot the 
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). The 
Ethiopian government made the following nine pledges to 
strengthen refugee self-reliance. 
2.2.3   Adoption of encampment policies in Kenya
Before 1990, the Kenyan government pursued a laissez-faire 
and open-door policy. Refugees were allowed to settle freely 
in urban centres throughout the country and secure their own 
means of livelihood. Support came from UNHCR-funded 
NGOs, community-based organisations (CBOs) and church-
based organisations. Towards the late 1980s, the approach 
began to change. While still focusing on self-reliance, refugees 
were forced to settle in rural camps.
With the beginning of the 1990s, the influx of large numbers 
of refugees from Somalia triggered a shift in discourse and 
practice. Refugees were accused of escalating crime and inse-
curity, particularly in urban areas, and harming Kenya’s tourist 
industry. This cohort of refugees was considered a burden, 
unequipped with skills to offer, in contrast to the ones who 
had arrived in the late 1980s, primarily from Uganda. In 1993, 
the Kenyan government attempted to pressurise UNHCR into 
forcefully repatriating refugees. This was unsuccessful, and the 
Kenyan government imposed the rule that refugees can only 
reside in camps in northern Kenya (Dadaab and Kakuma). Ref-
ugees were viewed as being the responsibility of the UNCHR 
and partner NGOs, while the local administration was there to 
ensure the safety and security of Kenyan citizens.
As of the early 2000s, the post-9/11 anti-terrorism discourse 
dominated, exacerbated by attacks by the Somali extremist 
group Al Shabaab (Lindley & Haslie, 2011). With Kenya being 
seen as a strategic partner for ‘the West’ in fighting terrorism, 
donors did not push for alternatives to encampment and repatri-
ation as responses to displacement (Miller, 2018). The Kenyan 
government also started taking control of camp management 
and ‘governing refugees’. This began with collaborative inter-
ventions in the North Eastern Province (NEP), focusing on ac-
cess to justice, reducing conflicts with refugees and introducing 
new projects to improve the situation of the receiving commu-
nities, which in sum resulted in a sharp decline in violent crime 
(Lindley & Haslie, 2011). 
With another large influx of refugees in 2011 and 2012, the 
securitisation trend increased. In October 2011, the government 
suspended the registration of refugees claiming that the refugee 
camps were too full and that accommodating more refugees 
would be a threat to national security (Teff & Yarnell, 2012). In 
the following years, the Kenyan government (mostly) unsuccess-
fully tried to impose a limit on refugees in the country by forced 
repatriation (UNHCR & World Bank Group, 2015; Regional 
Mixed Migration Secretariat, 2017; Mutambo, 2015). Returns 
have been taking place, pressurised by the withdrawal of as-
sistance (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2017) and the recurring 
threat by the Kenyan government (in 2016 and 2019) of closing 
down the Dadaab camp and asking UNCHR to accelerate repa-
triations and relocation (Mixed Migration Centre, 2019). 
1. expand the “out-of-camp” policy to benefit ten per cent of 
the current total refugee population
2. provide work permits to refugees and those with perma-
nent residence ID; 
3. provide work permits to refugees for sectors permitted for 
foreign workers;
4. increase enrolment of refugee children in pre-school, 
primary, secondary and tertiary education, without dis-
crimination and within available resources; 
5. make 10,000 hectares of irrigable land available, to 
enable 20,000 refugees and host community households 
(100,000 people) to grow crops; 
6. allow local integration for refugees who have lived in 
Ethiopia for over 20 years; 
7. work with international partners to build industrial parks 
to employ up to 100,000 individuals, with 30 per cent of 
the jobs reserved for refugees; 
8. expand and enhance basic and essential social services 
for refugees; 
9. provide other benefits, such as the issuance of birth 
certificates to refugee children born in Ethiopia and the 
possibility of opening bank accounts and obtaining driver’s 
licenses (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2017).
Box 2: Nine pledges to strengthen refugee self-reliance
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escalated into a full-fledged civil war from the spring of 2012 
onwards. The turning point was the Syrian army’s ground 
assault on Homs in March 2012 (Human Rights Watch, 2012). 
This changed the nature of the conflict from a security to a 
military approach (International Crisis Group, 2012), which led 
to a steep rise in casualties and displacement. 
Until March 2012, displacement was sparse and temporary. The 
first major displacements were recorded in June 2012, when 
about 150,000 villagers fled two Sunni villages in the Idlib 
Governate fearing retaliation by the Syrian Army. In mid-Au-
gust, the first Palestinian refugees were displaced, when 10,000 
fled the army’s shelling of the al-Ramel camp in Latakia. There 
are no safe zones or no-fly zones inside Syria—the reason why 
displacement has reached staggering proportions. In July 2012, 
more than 30,000 refugees entered Lebanon in 48 hours. From 
the start of 2013, nearly 50,000 people were fleeing Syria every 
week. By mid-2013, the UN casualty figure was more than 
100,000 dead, with 2015 estimates reaching 240,000. The con-
flict has since spread to the whole country and was compounded 
by the emergence of the so-called Islamic State (Daesh), the 
al-Nusra Front and other militant groups taking control of the 
eastern part of the country. Foreign troops, military aid to the 
Assad regime as well as airstrikes by Russia, followed later 
by the United States, France and Great Britain further com-
pounded the conflict and made this the largest displacement 
crisis in the world after World War II (Knudsen, 2014).
2.3.2  General policy approaches in the Middle East
Policies towards refugees in the Middle East have varied 
widely, depending on both time and groups concerned. For 
example, encampment has been a key element of Lebanon’s 
approach towards Palestinian refugees since 1948, separating 
them from the general population in terms of welfare and 
public services and keeping them under the responsibility of the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Jordan, 
in contrast, also established camps for Palestinian refugees but 
as suburbs connected to cities and as a pragmatic instrument to 
address housing needs. Jordan also granted citizenship to large 
2.3  Middle East
The Middle East has long been a region affected by large-scale 
and cross-border displacement, such as in the case of Arme-
nians and Assyrians in the interwar years, some of whom were 
resettled to Syria (Holborn, 1975). Also important, the arrival 
of large numbers of Jewish refugees and migrants from Europe 
and the related establishment of the Jewish state of Israel sets it 
apart from other regions that have received refugees. 
2.3.1  Patterns of displacement in the Middle East
Palestinian refugees are the longest-standing and largest case 
of forced displacement in the modern world. The ‘Nakba’ or 
‘Catastrophe’ of the massive displacement of Palestinians in 
1948 with the establishment of the state of Israel now means that 
approximately 20 per cent of the world’s refugees are Palestinian 
(American Muslims for Palestine, n.d.). Conversely, 67 per cent 
of all Palestinians worldwide are refugees or internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) within the contemporary state of Israel (Pales-
tine refugees, 2010). Of the originally displaced Palestinians in 
1948, approximately one-third went to the West Bank (Palestine 
refugees, n.d.), one-third went to Gaza, and the remainder split 
between Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The process was repeated 
in 1967, after the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were occupied 
by Israeli forces, and continues today with the establishment of 
the so-called Israeli ‘security fence’ on Palestinian land rather 
than the agreed-upon ‘Green Line’, with the establishment of  
Israeli settlements on Palestinian lands and by the forced evic-
tions of Palestinians from their homes. Significantly, Palestinian 
refugees are under the authority of a separate UN agency 
created before UNHCR, the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA) (Goddard, 2010). 
Another significant refugee flow since 2011 is that of Syrians. 
The Syrian conflict began in peripheral border villages in the 
south (Leenders, 2012), before spreading to major cities such 
as Aleppo and the capital Damascus (Leenders & Heydemann, 
2012). As regional and international mediation efforts, short-
lived truces and UN-observer missions failed, the conflict 
Country (host) International National policies Determinants Sub-national reception
Turkey EU-Turkey Deal, 2016 Camp and urban Political parties Mixed
Lebanon Lebanon Compact, 2016 No-camp policy †  Confessionalism Mixed
Jordan Jordan Compact, 2016 Camp and urban Tribal affiliation Mixed
Iraq NA Camp and urban Kurdish government Mixed
Table 1: Middle East receiving country policies towards Syrians
Note: †: Lebanon avoids the camp designation and refugees are self-settled. Source: Betts (2017); Knudsen (2017a).
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Syrian workforce in Lebanon before the conflict, estimated at 
somewhere around 800,000 in 2010 (Knudsen, 2017a).
Displaced Palestinians were barred from entering Lebanon in 
April 2014. Shortly afterwards, preparations began to limit the 
number of Syrians, but there were no formal entry restrictions 
until January 2015 (BUSL, 2015). From then on, Syrian refu-
gees have been required to obtain a valid six-month visa and 
fulfil one of seven new admission criteria. Syrians now have 
to renew their visas every six months. The entry visa and its 
extension are free, but after one year, they must apply for a re-
newal at the General Security Directorate. This costs US $200 
per person above the age of 15, an impossible charge for an av-
erage family. To avoid paying the exorbitant renewal fee, their 
only remaining option is to return to Syria and obtain a new 
exit visa to Lebanon. Even though they risk being apprehended 
at the border, around 300,000 displaced persons commute 
across the border for this purpose regularly. Expired residence 
visas can be renewed for a fee, but if renewal is denied for any 
reason, they can only be resettled by applying for a ‘plea of 
mercy’ (talab istirham) with the General Security Directorate 
and pay a fine of US $630 for a status settlement at the directo-
rate’s discretion (AI, 2014). If the plea is rejected, the applicant 
can be issued with a deportation or departure order.
2.3.5  Policy responses towards Palestinian  
refugees from Syria in Jordan
Before the Syrian civil war, 581,000 Palestinians lived in Syria 
who had been displaced by the Arab–Israeli wars of 1948 and 
1967. They lived primarily in the western and southwestern 
parts of Syria, including 13 refugee camps. The largest camp 
was Yarmouk with a population of nearly 150,000. The camp 
closest to Jordan was Dar‘a with 10,000 people. Palestinian ref-
ugees from Syria present a difficult case, as they are faced with 
compounded political vulnerabilities that other refugees from 
Syria do not. Most prominently, movement out of Syria renders 
them legally stateless and statusless. As a result of the Syrian 
civil war, 235,000 Palestinians have been internally displaced 
within Syria, and 60,000 Palestinians, alongside 2.2 million 
Syrians, have fled the country since October 2013. As of Jan-
uary 2019, UNHCR and UNRWA estimate that nearly 20,000 
Palestinians have fled from Syria into Jordan (AGPS, 2019). 
Many of the Palestinians in Syria had previously been residents 
in Jordan. After the Syrian uprising began in 2011, many of 
these Palestinians wanted to take up the option to return to 
Jordan. The government of Jordan refused to issue the papers, 
instead holding the Palestinians at the border for days, even 
months (with the exception of children under the age of six, 
who were permitted to enter for emergency medical treatment, 
although without their families). 
numbers of Palestinians, with some 50 per cent or more of the 
Jordanian populace thought to be of Palestinian origin. While 
Jordan has established a number of camps for non-self-settled 
Syrian refugees, (a minority of refugees) Lebanon has pursued 
a general non-camp policy, which means that nearly all the 
refugees are self-settled and live precariously in the country’s 
towns and cities and the Bekaa valley on the border with Syria 
(Knudsen, 2017b). 
2.3.3  International policy responses to Syrian  
displacement
The Syria crisis—a relatively recent crisis in the context of 
this review—is specific in that it triggered a massive European 
response, as a result of the interlinkage of displacement and 
migration to the European Union, both in terms of migration 
policies and enforcement measures as well as in terms of assis-
tance to major receiving countries such as Lebanon, Jordan and 
Turkey. As part of the EU’s externalisation policies, two new 
“compacts” were established under the European Neighbour-
hood Policy (ENP).
The specific goals of the Jordan and Lebanon compacts are to 
expand the legal employment options for Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon and Jordan (Howden, Patchett & Alfred, 2017). The 
compacts combine cash incentives and special economic zones 
(SEZs) where Syrian labour must form a significant part. Under 
the agreement, the goods produced in SEZs are eligible for 
preferential access to the European market and benefit from 
lower import taxes. The Jordan Compact was signed in 2016, 
but the programme has not been successful although opinions 
are mixed (Barbelet, Hagen-Zanker & Mansour-Ille, 2018). The 
aim was to reach a similar deal with Lebanon, but the Lebanon 
Compact (2016) has proved more difficult to implement. It 
aimed to create 300,000 to 350,000 new jobs in Lebanon, of 
which 60 per cent should be reserved for Syrians living there. 
This goal has not been realised, and it seems unrealistic that 
the programme could offer a solution to the employment crisis 
for the Syrians in Lebanon (see Seeberg, 2018; and Betts & 
Collier, 2018, for further details of the Jordan compact). In the 
following, we will discuss two specific policy shifts that had 
significant impacts on those affected at the time. 
2.3.4  National policy change: Lebanon (2014–2015)
Until January 2015, Syrians benefited from Lebanon’s spe-
cial relationship with Syria enshrined in bilateral treaties on 
security and socio-economic cooperation that secured prefer-
ential treatment of Syrian nationals. This agreement allowed 
Syrians—who only needed their ID—to reside and work in 
Lebanon without having to pay any fees or charges. The priv-
ileged status of Syrian ‘brothers’ was one reason for the huge 
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1979 caused mass movements of people across the eastern 
border into Pakistan (estimated at three million) and across the 
western border into Iran (estimated at 1.5 million). 
Afghan displacement can broadly be attributed to Cold War 
developments, especially from a process perspective, given that 
Cold War support to warring factions and ideological framings 
influenced the trajectory of conflict and attempts to bring peace 
and create the precondition for mitigating protracted displacement. 
However, the causes and suffering of political violence, war, 
and displacement have much more to do with internal factors, 
that is political controversies and competition among Afghan 
groups, than is commonly acknowledged (Mielke, 2019) 
Throughout the decade of the Soviet military intervention 
(1979–89), 3.1 million Afghans fled to Pakistan, between 1.7 
million and 2.2 million to Iran and 1.5 million to 2.2 million 
were internally displaced, totalling between 6.3 million and 7.3 
million displaced persons. This number, plus the refugees who 
fled to international locations, amounted to about one-third of 
the entire estimated Afghan population at the onset of conflict. 
Against the backdrop of the political developments, displace-
ment did not end with the withdrawal of Soviet military forces 
that ended in February 1989. In the following three decades, 
several waves of displacement and return occurred and a 
consolidation of circular movement patterns established over 
time. While in mid-2001, UNHCR estimated the numbers of 
Afghans to be living in Pakistan at two million and one million 
in Iran, return numbers thereafter were high above these num-
bers. A 2005 census in Pakistan showed that four years into the 
repatriation decade, still more than three million Afghans lived 
in Pakistan and 1.2 million in Iran—indicating gross underes-
timations of previous extrapolations of estimates (Kronenfeld, 
2008).
2.4.2  General policy approaches in Pakistan and Iran
Afghan refugees were welcomed in Iran and Pakistan once 
mass refugee movements due to ensuing large-scale violence 
connected to the Soviet military campaign began in January 
1980. Throughout the decade of Soviet intervention until 
February 1989, both countries practised a de facto open-door 
policy. Besides Muslim solidarity, the transnational social, 
ethnic and linguistic ties and connections which preceded  
the conflict, paved the way for the high acceptance of Afghan 
refugees in both countries. Moreover, refugees who fled to 
Pakistan were perceived as geopolitical instruments by US policy 
and resourcefully aided not on humanitarian but on strategic 
geopolitical grounds. 
With the ensuing civil war (1992–1995/6) after the fall of the 
‘communist’ regime in Kabul and continued violent conflict 
under the Taliban regime, the ideological and political context 
of refugee reception changed—most significantly because, 
ideologically, the dominant geopolitical reason for refugee 
When refugees from the Syrian war first began to stream into 
Jordan in 2011/12, the Jordanian Ministry of the Interior regis-
tered the newcomers (both Palestinian and Syrian) and placed 
them in the care of kafala or ‘sponsoring’ families registered 
with the Ministry of the Interior, mainly in its capital Amman. 
As the Syrian war intensified in 2012, Jordan worked rapidly 
to construct the huge Za‘atari camp, as well as other camps to 
accommodate the influx of new refugees from Syria. In mid-
2012, the kafala system was eliminated for Palestinians (as they 
quickly overwhelmed the capacity of their friend and family 
networks), and Syrians were moved into refugee camps such as 
Za‘atari, using the kafala system to get ‘bailed out’ of the camps 
until late 2015 when the kafala system was scrapped for all 
refugees from Syria. 
In mid-2012, the Jordanian government declared that Palestin-
ians from Syria were no longer allowed to cross the border. As 
a result, the Jordanian government forced many Palestinians to 
return to Syria, in violation of the international legal principle 
of non-refoulement and refused any new refugees who were 
Palestinians or who lacked papers showing, without doubt, their 
status as Syrians. In addition, the government asked all families 
who hosted Palestinians under the kafala system to present their 
guests for relocation to Cyber City. Cyber City closed in 2016, 
and the refugees were resettled to Europe or moved into another 
refugee camp for Syrians, King Abdullah Park. 
Thus, the policy trends for Palestinians from Syria who were 
displaced in Jordan have moved counter to many other global 
trends: From integration and rehabilitation through the kafala 
system, to a denial of entry and forced repatriation to Syria and 
to resettlement in a third country. This continues to define the 
case of Palestinian refugees as distinctive, even 70 years after 
their first displacement experiences.
2.4  South Asia
2.4.1  Patterns of displacement
The greatest population movements in South Asia are four-
fold: Afghan displacement (since the 1970s onwards), the mass 
displacements of an estimated 12 million people on the Indian 
subcontinent in the wake of India’s and Pakistan’s independ-
ence in 1947; the displacement of Bengalis to India in the sep-
aration war of West-Pakistan (Bangladesh) from East Pakistan 
(Pakistan) to India in 1971, and the recurrent displacement of 
the Rohingyas from the 1970s onwards. This review exclusively 
focuses on Afghan displacement. 
The displacement of Afghans since 1978 constitutes the main 
protracted displacement situation in South Asia for the past 40 
years. Political violence since 1973 (coup d’état ending mon-
archy/ 1978 Marxist coup d’état) and the subsequent war that 
unfolded as a reaction against Soviet intervention in December 
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undocumented Afghans a legally temporary stay in Pakistan, 
pending their return to Afghanistan, to regularise their legal 
status by acquiring a passport and visa” (IOM, 2018). Thus, 
ACC cardholders are more vulnerable. As Alimia (2019) 
pointed out, critics of ACCs argue that these constitute means 
to better control the Afghan population in Pakistan and provide 
the basis for their legal, social and economic marginalisation. 
Solutions strategy for Afghan refugees since 2012 (see also 
Ferreira et al., 2020 p. 16  Box 3).
The rise of the solutions strategy for Afghan refugees (SSAR) 
is strongly connected with the growing realisation of UNHCR 
and its partner governments that a) return to Afghanistan did 
not prove sustainable for various reasons and b) donor fatigue 
was increasingly becoming a challenge against the backdrop 
of other major displacement crises such as in Syria. The 
‘decade of repatriation’ in the 2000s saw more than five million 
Afghans returning to Afghanistan. At the same time, censuses 
of Afghans in Pakistan and Iran showed a large number who re-
mained and were unwilling to return. The return of such a large 
number of people had also overburdened the Afghan govern-
ment which had been fighting an insurgency ever since the first 
half of the 2000s and was plagued by other governance deficits 
(weak administrative structures, inadequate capacities for ab-
sorption, corruption, etc.). As a consequence, the return of large 
numbers of refugees risked creating or furthering instability. A 
Norwegian Refugee Council -study found that more than 70 per 
cent of the sampled returnees became returnee-IDPs, that is as 
repatriated Afghans, they experienced secondary displacement 
after return to Afghanistan (NRC, IDMC & Samuel Hall Con-
sulting, 2018). Whereas previously, conditions in Afghanistan 
were largely ignored in policy-proclamations focusing firmly 
on return (that should be exercised at once and fully if possible) 
without regard to the overall context, a growing understanding 
that the prospect of durable solutions to Afghans’ displacement 
remained rather unrealistic was breaking fresh ground (Tyler, 
2014).
Thus, in 2011, UNHCR initiated the ‘Solutions Strategy for  
Afghan Refugees’ (SSAR), a tripartite regional framework 
based on an agreement between UNHCR and the governments 
of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran, respectively, with a 
quadripartite steering committee. Launched in 2012 with the 
aims to ensure the protection of Afghan refugees and find 
durable solutions for them, it is currently in its fourth phase 
(2012/13–14, 2015–17, 2018/19, 2020/21). 
The three strategic pillars of the SSAR are in line with, yet 
clearly subordinated to, the overall aim of facilitating voluntary 
return and long-term (‘sustainable’) reintegration. The three 
pillars include (UNHCR, 2015):
• enhancing the absorption capacity in Afghanistan (e.g. by 
creating conditions conducive to voluntary repatriation 
through community-based investments in areas of high 
return) 
support had disappeared with the Soviet forces’ withdrawal and 
the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, several attempts to push 
Afghan refugees out of Iran and Pakistan occurred whenever 
the political framework conditions favoured it—either in the 
neighbouring countries when deepening economic crisis moti-
vated the regimes to portray Afghans as unnecessary additional 
burden (or later in Pakistan as ‘terrorists’) or when the political 
situation in Afghanistan itself looked favourable for refugee 
return. This, for instance, was the case after 1992 or when, with 
the takeover of the Taliban, Pakistan officially recognised the 
Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996). In the 2000s 
and 2010s, similar politically motivated ups and downs in 
refugee acceptance and respective governments’ attempts to rid 
itself of Afghans occurred (Mielke, 2019). In the following, we 
will discuss two recent policy initiatives specifically focussing 
on protection in a context of protracted displacement.  
2.4.3  Proof of residence (PoR) cards as a tool for 
basic protection of Afghans in Pakistan, since 2007
The 2005 census of Afghans revealed the presence of more than 
three million Afghans in Pakistan amid legal entry restrictions 
since 1999 and an ongoing repatriation programme of unprec-
edented scope. The widespread assumption had been that the 
bulk of the refugees would have returned by 2005. A four-
month registration exercise was conducted from October 2006 
to February 2007, 2.15 million Afghans were registered and 
received proof of residence (PoR) cards that were valid for two 
years, until 31 December 2009. With the PoR-cards, Afghans 
gained the official status as “Afghan citizen[s] temporarily 
residing in Pakistan” and became entitled to temporary legal 
stay and freedom of movement, protection against illegal arrest, 
detention and deportation. Besides, the cards granted access to 
basic health care and the government education system. It also 
enabled holders to open bank accounts, purchase mobile phone 
SIM cards and obtain driver’s licenses. 
The cards were extended 11 times at the time of writing. 
However, since the end of 2015, the PoR-cards were allowed to 
expire, with ad hoc, unpredictable extensions through official 
notification (often days and weeks after the previous cut-off 
date). The latest extension is set to expire on 30 June 2020. 
Often, these extensions depend on the state of Pakistan–Af-
ghanistan relations, which can change daily (Grawert & Mielke, 
2018). The uncertainty about the future of the PoR cards has 
motivated some Pakistan- born Afghans to apply for Afghan 
passports; however it requires them to regularly renew the visa 
at the designated border posts. Connected travel entails an 
extensive effort and expenses 
(Siddiqui, 2019).
Based on the 2015 National Action Plan, from mid-2017, the 
Pakistani government introduced Afghan Citizen Cards (ACC). 
ACC protection status is not comparable to the PoR-cards as it 
only protects from immediate deportation. “ACC cards grant 
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• new commitments to keep Afghan refugees high on the 
agenda of the international donor community11  and creating 
renewed interest among donors and stakeholders in building 
improved evidence bases on displacement.
Long-term national policies for refugees and foreign citizens 
who have been staying long-term have been and are lacking, 
both in Iran and Pakistan. Protectionist attitudes of both gov-
ernments have prioritised return of Afghans as the preferred 
durable solution. UNHCR has been navigating and trying to 
balance national interests and respective policy pushes by set-
ting up regional and international policy frameworks. However, 
UNHCR has not been able to exert enough agency or pressure 
for innovative policies regarding Afghans’ PDS. The regular 
tripartite agreements and the established regional policy frame-
works did not yield significantly new approaches to Afghans’ 
long-term displacement. Whether the continued collaboration 
of both governments with UNHCR is to be evaluated as pos-
itive, that is as a constructive element towards finding lasting 
solutions with existing exchange formats by default or whether 
it does not actually constitute a sign of inertia and thus actively 
inhibits prospective innovation is subject to a different study.
2.5  Summary: Policy responses to protracted  
displacement
The variety of responses to protracted displacement situations 
in the different regions under study suggest above all that policy 
responses are highly circumstantial, devised in response to both 
domestic and international constraints, and vary depending on 
opportunities and challenges in the face of particular protracted 
displacement situations. At the same time, the different policy 
responses also highlight the role of international factors, the 
opportunities for devising principles and frameworks on an 
international level, despite significant deviations in practice. 
The phasing-out of camps in the Ethiopian context, as well as 
the Jordan and Lebanon compacts, have thus been strongly 
driven by international factors and European pressure in par-
ticular. Both show, however, the continuing persistence of the 
desire to contain refugees and to apply ‘place-based fixes’, with 
international and domestic interests converging. At the same 
time, these initiatives also reflect a re-discovery of refugees’ 
economic potentials and a related drive for removal of restric-
tions on employment and movement within the territory. 
The shift towards encampment policies in Kenya in the late 
1980s, but also restrictions imposed on Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon post-2015 show a contrasting trend responding to 
perceived threats to security or welfare posed by refugees. In a 
11 The governments of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan adopted a Joint Resource 
Mobilization Strategy in 2013.
• building Afghan refugees capacities and providing liveli-
hood opportunities
• preserving protection space in host countries, with emphasis 
on enhanced support for refugee-hosting communities in 
Pakistan and resettlement to third countries in Iran (cf. 
UNHCR, 2018b).
It is worth noting that the integrated approach of SSAR built 
on unique country-specific portfolios from 2014 onwards. For 
example, in Afghanistan, stakeholders focused on reintegration 
and the facilitation of returnees’ integration into national devel-
opment frameworks to ensure that their needs are recognised 
and addressed as part of greater development efforts in the 
country. One such project initiative foresaw the identification 
and establishment of 48 pilot sites in high return areas to assist 
with shelter, social services, employment and achieving food 
security. The Iranian portfolio centred on essential services 
provision, for instance, besides shelter and food security, 
emphasis was put on education and vocational training to build 
professional skills of Afghans that would prove as pull factors 
once an Afghan employment market is in place. In Pakistan, 
the emphasis was on the support of hosting areas by carrying 
on with and extending the Refugee Affected and Hosting Areas 
Programme, which became an integral part of SSAR. 
After UNHCR had tried in vain to persuade the receiving gov-
ernments to allow Afghans’ local integration (IOM, 2017) and 
work productively with the de facto long-term presence of  
Afghans in Iran and Pakistan before 2011, the auxiliary narrative 
taken up in the SSAR now changed to pursue developmental 
measures and establish—albeit limited—spaces of protec-
tion focused on self-reliance and resilience of Afghans in the 
host context and after return (Afghan Displacement Solutions 
Platform, 2018, p. 43; IOM, 2016). In that line, the Refugee 
Affected and Hosting Areas Programme adopted the language 
of empowerment and participation. Projects were designed to 
enhance Afghans’ capacities for self-organisation in Pakistan, 
for example through the creation of community-based and 
village organisations.  
The most important impacts of the policy were 
• a perpetuation of the conventional durable solutions frame-
work with a focus on return as an only viable solution in the 
case of Afghans’protracted displacement situations;
• a recognition that the sustainability of Afghans’ repatriation 
depends on a domestically conducive environment for rein-
tegration (in Afghanistan);
• the creation of a limited asylum space/ protection for Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan and Iran by changing the narrative 
towards self-reliance and resilience-building in refugee/ dis-
placement management in a context where local integration 
is politically not desired;
• the extension of measures from purely humanitarian to 
developmental activities involving ‘refugee-affected hosting 
areas’ and investments in Afghans’ human capital through 
livelihood-building support; and 
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similar vein, Tanzania as one of the main Eastern African re-
ceiving countries has recently followed a more restrictive path. 
In all these cases, the reasons for policy changes seem to have 
less to do with refugee situations themselves but with changing 
domestic and international circumstances. Similarly, the 
solutions strategy for Afghan refugees focussing very much on 
return was less about finding durable solutions than resolving a 
situation that governments were concerned with, engendering 
adverse impacts on refugees targeted by the initiative. 
As Section 1 (above) suggests, there is a history of failure in 
imposing solutions (and aid), and there is a lack of consider-
ation of refugees’ wishes. At the same time, more favourable 
policies such as Tanzania’s rural settlement schemes, even if 
implemented in a somewhat top-down fashion, did achieve 
positive results, such as an increase in agricultural produc-
tivity, pointing at gains to be made for less constraining policy 
approaches.  
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vein, temporary or seasonal migration has long been a necessity 
in the Horn of Africa, where many people rely on pastoralism 
for their livelihoods (Research and Evidence Facility, 2017). 
In such a context, kinship ties across international borders are 
often invoked to emphasise the normalcy of being hosted across 
the border, as research by Hovil (2007) demonstrates for the 
case of Congolese in Uganda. 
3.1  Mobility patterns after displacement
The extant literature demonstrates that mobility constitutes an 
important dimension of displaced persons’ post-displacement 
trajectories. Yet, mobility options are often highly constrained, 
both in terms of internal movement and in terms of cross-
border movement. 
3.1.1 Urban vs. rural areas
Research on the Middle East shows that, where policies allow 
self-settlement, displaced populations often prefer urban areas 
(Earle, 2016). Post-displacement choices are influenced by pre-
vious knowledge, kinship, social networks, religion/denomina-
tion and security considerations (Knudsen, 2017a). In Lebanon, 
for instance, which maintains a non-camp approach for Syrian 
refugees, most Syrians have settled among poor (Sunni) co- 
religionists and other refugee groups such as the Palestinians 
(Knudsen, 2018). 
Where policies restricting freedom of movement have been 
pursued, refugee settlements and/ or camps have often been 
located in rural and border regions, such as in the case of Daadab 
or Kakuma camps in Kenya or settlements for Rwandan and 
Burundian refugees in Tanzania. While these policies have not 
necessarily prevented movement altogether, they do affect the 
lives of refugees, such as young Burundian refugees who move 
to Dar Es Salaam (Sommers, 2001). In a similar vein, while 
there are restrictions on leaving the Daadab refugee camp in 
Kenya, many Somali refugees (with the help of remittances) 
have moved to Kenya’s urban areas and de-facto integrated 
economically (Lindley & Haslie, 2011). Remittances have also 
allowed many to buy Kenyan ID cards, which permit freedom 
of movement and access to formal employment and higher 
education. However, these cards often come at a higher cost 
than anticipated, as these refugees have been excluded from the 
official resettlement process (Lindley & Haslie, 2011; Immigra-
tion and Refugee Board of Canada, 2016; Grayson, 2017). 
3.  The role of mobility and  
connectivity as “bottom-up”  
responses to displacement
A key concern of the TRAFIG project is to examine to what 
extent translocal links, mobilities and connectivity provide 
displaced people with resources to cope with protracted dis-
placement situations and, potentially, with means to exit such 
situations. The first section above has made clear that mobility 
has been a central element of political solutions to long-term 
refugee situations since the very emergence of a rudimentary 
international refugee protection regime in the 1920s. The role of 
translocal linkages, including diasporic links and connectivity 
more generally, by contrast, has not been a prominent topic in 
wider political debates on solutions to protracted displacement 
situations. One exception perhaps are the debates on milita-
rised refugee communities and “refugee warriors” (cf. Terry, 
2002), in which violent homeland-oriented politics are pointed 
out not only as drivers of the continuation of conflict but also 
as an expression of the absence of wider political solutions to 
the causes of refugee flows. However, to what extent translocal 
connectivity and mobility can provide solutions, has not been 
examined widely. 
In this section, we focus on different dimensions of translocal 
linkages and connectivity12 , including refugees’ mobilities 
after displacement, transnational family ties and related mobili-
ties, financial and social remittances, transnational political  
relations and the role of information and communication technol-
ogies (ICT) in maintaining translocal connections. Reflecting 
the scope and nature of the available literature on which this 
review was built, this section is organised thematically. It does 
not aim at giving a comprehensive account of the literature on 
translocal connections in the four regions covered, but rather at 
distilling some dimensions relevant also for the wider TRAFIG 
project.
Translocal connections already play a role in the context of 
the first displacement of people. Overall, there is a tendency 
for refugees to choose the nearest possible destination and a 
place where others like them have gone in the past (Moore & 
Shellman, 2007, p. 32). For instance, Afghans have tradition-
ally been a highly mobile population due to scarce economic 
opportunities within the country, resulting in seasonal labour 
migration, nomadism, long-term labour migration in neigh-
bouring countries, pre-state trade and socio-economic relations 
with Persia and India (Silk Road) and religiously motivated 
migration. Different waves of displacement since 1979 have fol-
lowed these paths (Monsutti, 2008; Rohani, 2014). In a similar 
12 For a conceptual discussion of transnationalism, translocality and connectivity 
see Etzold et al. (2019).
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where English or Luganda are the two most common languages. 
Many also reported that they faced discrimination (Dryden- 
Peterson, 2006; Stark et al., 2015). 
Dryden-Peterson (2006, p. 385) summarises the benefits of 
moving to Kampala as “expanded employment opportunities, 
improved educational possibilities for themselves and their 
children, increased security through anonymity, and proximity 
to family, telecommunications, and resettlement opportunities” 
(see also Boer, 2015; Clark-Kazak, 2011; Ramsay, 2016; Russell, 
2011).
3.1.2  Cross-border onward and circular movements
Onward and/or circular cross-border migration constitutes an 
important strategy to exit constrained situations in countries of 
first asylum. 
One way of doing so is through resettlement. Even though re-
settlement is only an option for a minority of displaced persons, 
research on South Sudanese refugees has shown that where 
resettlement is seen as an option, people are discouraged from 
pursuing irregular migration channels (MGSoG, 2017). How-
ever, many South Sudanese refugees simply lack the resources 
to move on. The desire of those who have experienced family 
separation, where children and women have moved to safety to 
camps and men have stayed behind to look after their belong-
ings or to fight, to return to South Sudan is another factor. 
Finally, favourable Ugandan refugee policies (the country hosts 
the largest number of South Sudanese refugees) have also been 
identified as another reason for not moving on. Resettlement 
also plays an important role in the imagination of Congolese 
refugees in Uganda (Boer, 2015) and in Kenya’s Kakuma camp 
(Grayson, 2017), even if actual numbers of resettled refugees 
are small. Resettlement, in turn, may involve subsequent mobil-
ities and new translocal arrangements (cf. Box 3 below)
As Lindley (2007) has demonstrated for Somali refugees, re-
mittances play an important role in not only allowing displaced 
people to move out of Kenyan camps to Nairobi but also for 
their irregular onward movement to ‘the West’. In a similar 
vein, 39 per cent of the Syrians interviewed for the 2018 MMS 
Report received money from relatives abroad to fund their 
journey to Europe (Mixed Migration Centre, 2018).
Circular labour migration between their respective receiving 
countries and other states in the region, including Israel, Kuwait 
or Saudi Arabia has been vital for Palestinian refugees, most 
of whom have remained in the region. However, restrictions of 
circular migration by Israel after the 1967 war, by Jordan after 
the 1970 clashes and by Lebanon after the 1982 Israeli invasion 
as a result of its war with the PLO, as well as after subsequent 
events, have reduced opportunities in the respective countries. 
Research on refugees in the Horn of Africa has thus shown that 
closed camps do not prevent people from moving but increase 
the selectivity of mobility. Livelihood constraints and security 
considerations induce onward migration. Similar to the strategies 
Somali refugees have used to be able to move, Eritreans either 
bypass or leave refugee camps in eastern Sudan, using unoffi-
cial channels to acquire citizenship, ID cards and travel permits 
to exit the camps (Research and Evidence Facility, 2017).
Furthermore, multi-locality and splitting time (or the family) 
between the camp and cities is also an explicit strategy to spread 
economic risks. Grayson (2017) describes that families split 
up between the camp and the cities with wives and children 
staying in the camps to have access to affordable living and 
education while breadwinners, mostly men, work in the cities 
and send money back (Grayson, 2017). As Belloni et al. (2018) 
highlight, the capacity of women to stay put is the main ena-
bling factor for men to engage in mobility. Mirroring Grayson’s 
findings, Grabska (2014) describes how refugees who live in 
Nairobi and other cities in Kenya regularly travel to the Kakuma 
refugee camp to receive food rations and carry them back to 
the cities, using their anchoring in the city and the camps as a 
strategic device.
In the Afghan case, the government of Pakistan allowed Afghan 
refugees to move from the rural camps to cities in search for 
work and income after the World Food Programme (WFP) 
stopped providing food aid to Afghan Refugee Villages in 1995. 
By 2006, the camp population amounted to 45 per cent of the 
registered Afghans, whereas 55 per cent lived in towns and 
cities (SAFRON, 2007). However, the trend to settle informally 
in the cities, especially in Peshawar and Karachi, had been 
prevalent from the beginning of the 1980s onwards. Those 
who did not settle in AVRs were usually neither registered nor 
included in the overall aid infrastructure for refugees. 
Access to services is at the heart of the choice between settling 
in a refugee camp or in urban areas of Kampala. Even though 
the Ugandan government and UNHCR tend to promote settle-
ment in the camps (Lyytinen, 2015), Uganda’s Refugee Act of 
2006 legally allows refugees to remain and work in Kampala, if 
they can prove self-reliance (Boer, 2015). The benefit of living 
in a refugee camp is that basic services such as food rations, 
non-food items, a plot of land, and less costly school fees are 
provided (Hovil, 2007; Stark, DeCormier Plosky, Horn & Cana-
vera, 2015). Yet, there is greater individual freedom and more 
economic opportunities in the city. 
Moving to Kampala thus constitutes a trade-off, as refugees 
are then left to fend for themselves (Clark-Kazak, 2014, 2011; 
Hovil, 2007). In Kampala, many refugees work in the informal 
sector as street vendors, in construction or porting (Stark et al., 
2015). However, for francophone Congolese, despite their 
knowledge of Swahili, it was harder to find a job in Kampala, 
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As Coates (2014, pp. 103–104) suggests, mobility choices may 
be highly strategic and circumstantial: In one case, a Congolese 
male unable to permanently escape the insecurity of Goma 
due to the large size of his family and the costs of relocation to 
Uganda, resorts to short-time economically motivated mo-
bility between the two countries and travels to Uganda twice 
a month—paying for a US $50 visitor visa each time—to buy 
goods and take them back for sale in Goma. In another ex-
ample, Coates describes the case of a Congolese refugee who 
went to South Africa after being unable to find employment in 
Uganda, obtained refugee status and family reunification for 
his family there and returned to the Congo after several years 
when the situation seemed to stabilise. Following the repeated 
deterioration of the security situation after 2006, he returned to 
Uganda, this time on an ordinary visa, as he would not be able 
to move to and fro as a refugee, splitting his time between the 
DRC and Uganda. 
The Syrian refugee crisis is unique in terms of the scale of—in 
part secondary—migration to Europe, which started in 2015. 
Unlike previous refugee crises, the Mediterranean refugee 
crisis was marked by the connectivity of refugees, migrants and 
smugglers alike. They used mobile phones extensively to con-
nect with families at home and abroad and organised transfer to 
Europe by connecting with smugglers who, via mobile devices 
and social media (facebook) publicised their services and 
connected with potential clients (migrants). Advocacy groups 
also provided updated information on asylum and registration 
procedures to migrants on the move. Images of fatalities were 
also used to mobilise support for migrants and their plight (cf. 
Aiken, Einsporn, Greco, Landry & Navarro Fusillo, 2017 on the 
Alan Kurdi incident). The extensive use of mobile phones, mobile 
applications (WhatsApp, Viber) and social media has been 
widely documented, and detailed studies of mobile phone usage 
testify to its importance to migrants, but also that this infor-
mation is triangulated with other information at their disposal 
(Dekker, Engbersen, Klaver & Vonk, 2018). 
Although the large majority of displaced Syrians live in neigh-
bouring countries, about one million have migrated to Europe. 
Germany was both the premier destination for refugees and  
received the largest numbers, while islands such as Lesbos, 
Malta and Lampedusa functioned as transit points along the route 
towards Europe (DeBono, 2016, 2013; Papataxiarchis, 2016). 
3.1.3  Temporary and permanent returns
As becomes clear from the cases described by Coates (2014), 
return often needs to be understood as part of broader patterns 
of repeated mobility and temporary migration. Temporary 
return is sometimes necessary for retaining one’s rights to land 
and property. Palestinians registered in the West Bank must 
return regularly to retain their right to residence there (Lubbad, 
This has created incentives to move further afield; European 
countries, the United States and Chile were on the top of the list 
of destinations. This said, circular migration out of the West 
Bank for work or educational opportunities remains important 
(Lubbad, 2008).
Research on Congolese refugees in Uganda (Clark-Kazak, 
2014) highlights their high degree of mobility: Before they 
even reached Uganda, many Congolese had already been in 
a state of protracted and multiple (internal) displacement for 
many years, especially in North and South Kivu (Beytrison & 
Kalis, 2013). In the search for safety within their own country, 
some might have sought refuge in other cities such as Goma or 
Bukavu or lived with relatives in the village (Lyytinen, 2013). 
Lyytinen (2013) found that many Banyamulenge had spent time 
in Burundi (in Gatumba camp) or Rwanda before they arrived 
in Uganda, and that yet others were planning to reach Tanzania, 
but were stranded in Uganda because of a lack of resources to 
travel further. 
Amani, 20 years old at the time of the research, was seven 
years old when her eldest sister Hélène married Nick. After 
the wedding, the couple took Amani to live with them in their 
home in Bukavu because Amani’s parents could not support 
her, her five brothers and four sisters. Nick, on the other 
hand, was a human rights activist and Hélène was in petty 
trade, meaning that they were better off.
By 2004, increased insecurity and threats against Nick 
because of his work as a human rights activist led Nick 
to decide that the family should escape to Kampala—and 
that Amani should come with them. Amani registered as 
a dependent on Nick’s refugee claim. In Kampala, living 
conditions were hard. The family did not have much money, 
and Amani was unable to attend school and, as she was 
supposed to do many chores in the house, did not have much 
opportunity to interact with others.
Nick decided to apply for resettlement, and in January 2007, 
the family was resettled to Canada. Amani moved with Nick 
and Hélène because they had registered her as their child 
on the resettlement application. From here, it was arranged 
that Amani would marry the youngest brother of one of 
Nick’s friends—as such strengthening the bond between 
Nick’s friend and his brother, Amani’s new husband, how-
ever, were resettled to the United States. For this reason, 
Amani and her husband decided to live in a small border 
town on the Canadian side so Amani could fulfil her re-
quirements to become a Canadian citizen while her husband 
could continue to work in the United States. 
Source: Clark-Kazak (2011, pp. 101-112).
Box 3: Amani’s story—An example of transnational family 
dynamics
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Of the Somali refugees who lived in the Daadab camp in 
Kenya, following a 2014 return intention survey (IOM & 
UNHCR, 2014), only an estimated 2.6 per cent intended to 
return to Somalia within 24 months. Of those, Somali refugees 
who had arrived in the initial wave fleeing conflict in 1991 to 
2001 expressed the least interest (compared to those who had 
fled drought in 2002 to 2007 and 2008 to 2013), as they had 
fewer (family) ties and knowledge about property or employ-
ment options in Somalia (IOM & UNHCR, 2014). Those who 
do intend to return already travel back and forth four times 
more than those who do not intend to do so, mainly to visit 
family, some to check in on property, agriculture or business 
(IOM & UNHCR, 2014). Nonetheless, between 1990 and 2005, 
an estimated one million refugees returned to Somalia volun-
tarily or by coercion (Lindley & Haslie, 2011).
The most detailed analysis in the Syrian context is the World 
Bank’s study of the mobility of displaced Syrians (2019), in 
particular, return-migration to Syria. The report finds that re-
turn to Syria has been very low: approximately 100,000 Syrians 
returned between 2015 and 2018. The highest returns are from 
Iraq (10.8 per cent of the refugee population), probably due to 
the difficult security situation in the border regions of Iraq. The 
study confirms that the primary factor determining return is the 
security situation in Syria. Single male Syrians are more likely 
to return. Within Syria, the access to services is determined 
by the displacement, destruction and disorganisation (3Ds) 
situation.
A recent study of return migration of Syrians from Lebanon 
(Mhaissen & Hodges, 2019) likewise confirms that the difficult 
conditions in the receiving country remain a significant push 
factor. However, voluntary return is significantly tempered by 
protection risks in their home country. For many, this means 
re-displacement and return to Lebanon, often saddled with 
additional debts. The same study also details the many threats 
to returnees that, in addition to general insecurity, include 
forced conscription in the army, post-return detention, arrest 
and extra-judicial killings. Refugees who have not heeded calls 
to return and register their homes, land and property (HLP), 
may have these expropriated by the government under Law No. 
10 of April 2018 (Decrees 63 & 66), annexed (using Law No 19 
of 2012 on counterterrorism), demolished or resold/redeveloped 
(Mhaissen & Hodges, 2019, p. 64). The deep social tensions and 
divisions also reflect the difficult conditions inside Syria that go 
along with a culture of fear, lack of accountability and a history 
of forced disappearances, extra-judicial killings and intimida-
tion—all considerable disincentives to voluntary return.
Return can also be destabilising for individuals and a country 
as a whole. After the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the 
subsequent victory of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic 
Army, an estimated one million Rwandan refugees, who had 
mostly been displaced between 1959 and 1962, as well as their 
2008). Temporary return may also be necessary to navigate the 
policies of the neighbouring country of asylum. When Lebanon 
tightened the criteria and significantly hiked up the price of visa 
renewal in 2015, around 300,000 Syrian refugees were forced 
to cross the border between Syria and Lebanon at risk of being 
apprehended, to obtain a new residence permit, rather than 
renewing an existing one (BUSL, 2015; Amnesty International, 
2014). 
For many displaced people, physical visits to the country of or-
igin are not easily possible in contexts marked by high degrees 
of control and continuing violence: Thus, although informal 
cross-border movements between Somalia and Kenya have 
become more frequent, refugees who live in Dadaab very rarely 
travel between Somalia and Kenya; indeed, 96.7 per cent of 
families never travel (IOM, UNHCR, 2014, p. 11). Many refu-
gees in Dadaab have not been able to leave since they arrived in 
the early 1990s. 
(Permanent) voluntary return is one of the three classical 
durable solutions. Research on Ugandan IDPs displaced by 
the insurgency of the Lord Resistance Army in the north of 
the country shows that while indeed a large majority of IDPs 
returned, aid programmes were phased out and the government 
initiated a recovery programme, it is unclear whether returning 
IDPs were indeed able to find a ‘durable’ solution (Both, 2017; 
Kwaks, 2018). 
In the Horn of Africa, over four million refugees and IDPs  
returned to their areas of origin between 2006 and 2013, although 
this does not necessarily mean that they find durable solutions 
to their situation of displacement (UNHCR & World Bank 
Group, 2015). While the phenomenon in the region is generally 
not well researched, some studies give insights into the motiva-
tions and characteristics of return processes. In South Sudan, 
there seems to be a strong sense that people ‘return home,’ for 
patriotic considerations, wanting to contribute to building a 
viable and peaceful South Sudan. A study on Somali returnees 
found that three-quarters of returnees were living in a tempo-
rary shelter (UNHCR & World Bank Group, 2015; Samuel Hall 
Consulting, 2014). Among the coping mechanisms deployed by 
returnees was secondary migration back to sites of displacement.
In 2003, as part of Rwanda’s policy of citizen repatriation, it 
signed a tripartite agreement with Uganda and UNHCR to 
repatriate 25,000 Rwandan refugees from Uganda. Only 850 
accepted to return and—upon arrival—many of them returned 
almost immediately to Uganda claiming insecurity and human 
rights violations (Ahimbisibwe, 2017). Between 2002 and 2009, 
700,000 Burundians returned as a result of the signing of peace 
accords in 2000, subsequent ceasefires and changing regional 
and global asylum policies (Weima, 2016). Many perceived this 
return as a form of continual displacement and re-displacement 
within their own country (Purdekova, 2017; Weima, 2016). 
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3.2 Translocal family dynamics
Displacement often involuntarily splits families (Grayson, 2017; 
Lyytinen, 2013). At times, families choose to separate to spread 
the physical and economic risk. In the case of South Sudan, 
women and children often cross the border on their own or are 
accompanied by their male family members, who, having en-
sured their family’s safety, return to look after their property or 
to fight (MGSoG, 2017). To spread economic risk, families split 
up between the camp and urban areas. Breadwinners, usually 
men, work in cities and wives and children stay in camps with 
access to affordable services and education (Grayson, 2017). 
Laws and policies of countries of asylum may also create a 
legal divide between family members. Due to pre-existing 
tribal linkages across the border, mixed marriages between 
Afghan and Pakistani citizens were common even before the 
mass Afghan displacement. However, Afghan spouses in mixed 
marriages face severe legal and administrative hurdles under 
Pakistan’s Citizenship Act. This includes restrictions on mar-
riage and birth registration. Furthermore, while a child of a Pa-
kistani father receives Pakistani citizenship, the Afghan mother 
does not. A similar restriction applies in Iran, where children of 
non-Iranian fathers are denied citizenship, thus making them 
stateless (Abbasi-Shavazi & Sadeghi, 2011; Alikarami, 2016; 
Rohani, 2014). 
In several displacement contexts, family reunification is often 
not possible. The second most common reason for Palestinians 
to return to the West Bank for is for marriage, even though 
Israel rarely permits family reunification at all, nor allows a 
spouse or children to travel to the West Bank for family reuni-
fication. As a result, there are three possible family dynamics 
in the West Bank: 1) living separately, where the spouses live 
apart and the children live with one of the parents; 2) main-
taining a truncated family life and spending time with their 
spouse only during visits to the Occupied Territories, which are 
short and subject to Israeli approval; or 3) moving elsewhere, 
abandoning their home, parents, and homeland. This policy 
has compelled tens of thousands of Palestinians to live apart, 
which causes emotional problems and strain on mental health 
(B’Tselem, 1999).
3.3 Translocal economic dynamics
3.3.1 Connectivity and access to livelihoods
Restrictions on mobility severely limit refugees’ ability to 
engage in their livelihoods effectively. In particular, those who 
live in camps are reported to have low levels of self-reliance 
regardless of their literacy rates. A lack of mobility limits ref-
ugees from running their own business pushing them towards 
being employed by the receiving community and only engaging 
in petty trade (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2019; Ruaudel & 
descendants, returned to Rwanda from neighbouring countries. 
While it was not felt immediately (due to the mass exodus of 
1994), problems started to arise once those displaced in 1994 
repatriated in larger numbers, particularly in terms of access to 
land and the restoration of property (Adelman & Barkan, 2011; 
Hilhorst & Van Leeuwen, 2000). The large-scale return of older 
cohorts of Rwandan refugees in itself reflects both real and per-
ceived insecurity of older Rwandan refugees’ in exile, despite 
their otherwise successful integration, including the acquisition 
of citizenship especially in Tanzania and Uganda. But it also 
reflects the Rwandan Patriotic Army’s success in politically 
mobilising, and organising, its military operation against the 
then Rwandan regime and for return (Kraler, 2004).13  
Return to at best tenuous stability has also characterised recent 
large-scale returns to Afghanistan in the context of significant 
structural constraints. These included the damage to marketing 
and irrigation infrastructure, loss of agricultural productivity, 
the inability of rural and urban economies (with the exception 
of Kabul maybe) to absorb large numbers of returnees and con-
tinued uncertainty over political stability at national and local 
levels. Governance failures like intervention-based economic 
restructuring attempts, high levels of corruption and political 
favouritism, absence of rule of law (e.g. land governance, jus-
tice, conflict resolution), discrimination of returnees according 
to ethnic and factional belonging, lack of service delivery in the 
reconstruction process (including security) and subsequent loss 
of the government’s legitimacy against other locally ordering 
forces added to the adverse conditions for return and reinte-
gration. Thus, repatriation is focused on few urban centres like 
the capital Kabul and Jalalabad, the border city to Pakistan 
and provincial capital of Nangarhar Province (UNHCR, 2017). 
Because of ongoing conflict, internal displacement has been 
increasing, and secondary displacement of returnees is not unu-
sual given the vulnerable livelihoods. In addition, the incidence 
of secondary movement among the returnees who came back in 
2013 is twice as high compared to those who returned in 2002, 
despite the fact that there were almost 50 times more returnees 
in 2002 than in 2013 (UNHCR, 2018b).
As research has shown, many diaspora-Somalis who returned 
to Somalia possess a secure residence status or citizenship in 
their country of emigration (Hammond, Awad, Dagane, Horst, 
Hansen, Menkhaus & Obare, 2011). They are hence able to 
leave Somalia again when the security situation deteriorates.
13 Kraler (2004) quotes a survey conducted in Tanzania in 1991/92, shortly after 
the Rwandan Patriotic Army’s first abortive invasion of Rwanda in October 
1990, which concluded that return had ceased to be an issue, which in hind-
sight turned out to be a miscalculation.
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Often, refugees do not have access to formal financial services 
such as bank accounts or credit, due to a lack of proper identi-
fication papers, distrust of the formal banking system, or a lack 
of access to formal financial institutions in rural areas (Norwe-
gian Refugee Council, 2015; Tobin, 2019b; Chehade et al., 2017; 
IOM, 2014). Credit, remittances and other financial transactions 
are thus performed via semi-formal or informal services such as 
mobile fund transfers and the Informal Value Transfer Systems 
(IVTS) (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2015) such as the hawala 
system of intermediary brokers. In East Africa and the Horn 
of Africa, the local population and refugees use mobile money 
services such as the Kenyan M-PESA system. These systems, 
too, have limitations. For instance, a lack of telecommunication 
network for mobile-based transfers, such as experienced by ref-
ugees in some Ethiopian camps, hampers the receipt of remit-
tances (Hammond, 2011). The cost of sending money often is a 
major limitation. For instance, using the hawala system to send 
money to Syrian IDPs is relatively cheap from Jordan but very 
costly from Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the Pakistan–Afghanistan 
remittance corridor is one of the most expensive worldwide.
Of all the economic coping strategies utilised by refugees, 
remittances are the best researched. However, even this 
research is quite limited because remittances are more com-
monly studied in the context of economic migration rather than 
displacement (World Bank Group, 2016), not to mention that 
it is impossible to distinguish flows by refugees and migrant 
workers. Remittances amongst Somali refugees have been the 
most researched among the Horn of Africa countries. Even 
so, little to no data exists on internal remittance flows (ACP 
Observatory on Migration, 2011), nor on the role remittances 
play for IDPs. 14 Nonetheless, remittances have been identified 
as an essential factor in strengthening resilience and reducing 
vulnerabilities of IDPs, particularly in camps (Bryld, Kamau & 
Sinigallia, 2014). Refugees in camps also receive remittances 
and it appears that those who have been living in the camps for 
longer are more likely to be recipients of remittances (Grayson, 
2013). 
Remittances are often used to improve educational and 
professional development. For Palestinians, education is the 
primary motivator of mobility and the sending of remittances. 
Palestinians abroad have been a major source of assistance for 
recipients to complete higher education. Thus, 82 per cent of 
those with higher education received assistance from relatives 
abroad.
14 For instance, there is a clear record of remittance inflow into Syria before the 
Syrian conflict (2010). Since then, that figure has been repeated over the civil 
war period suggesting a lack of data (KNOMAD, 2019). Cf, Howe, Krystalli, 
Krishnan, Kurtz, & Macaranas (2017) detailing how Syrians adapted their 
livelihoods within Syria during the conflic, including access to cash, capital and 
the role of loans and remittances.
Morrison-Métois, 2017). This also applies to situations of IDPs, 
who, with a far higher percentage of those who are displaced, 
engage in seasonal and daily labour (supplemented where pos-
sible by labour migration), in comparison to those restricted to 
the camps (Young & Jacobsen, 2013). 
This is even further exacerbated where there is a lack not only 
of mobility but also of connectedness. Social networks are 
strongly correlated with employment, well-being and integra-
tion (Ager & Strang, 2008; Stevens, 2016; Wall, Otis Campbell 
& Janbek, 2017). In Ethiopia, a lack of social and business 
connections to communities outside the camps or limited 
connection to the urban markets within the camps results in 
limiting available jobs to the construction sector, petty trading 
or with NGOs and refugee-serving organisations (Research and 
Evidence Facility, 2017; Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014). 
A further plunge towards marginalisation and vulnerability oc-
curs where there is a collapse of social networks not only with 
the local population but also among the refugee group itself, as 
research has demonstrated to be the case with Syrian refugees 
in Irbid, Jordan. This lack of internal, translocal and transna-
tional connectedness manifests itself by a lack of remittances 
and the fact that the most vulnerable refugees in the community 
resort to the informal credit (wasta) system (Chehade, Navarro 
& Sobol, 2017; Stevens, 2016; Wall et al., 2017).
Being near, among and connected to the local population facili-
tates trade and livelihood opportunities for the local and refugee 
communities. Such opportunities include refugees being employed 
by the local communities (Enghoff, Hansen, Umar, Gildestad, 
Owen & Obara, 2010; Samuel Hall Consulting, 2019; Ruaudel & 
Morrison-Métois, 2017) and vice versa (Grabska, 2014). 
3.3.2 Remittances
Remittances can constitute an important source of income 
for many displaced people. However, they are also a source of 
stratification, reflecting class, ethnic and other lines of strati-
fication amongst remitting diaspora communities (cf. Hanifi, 
2006, p. 103 on the Afghan diaspora). As a result, remittances 
received can differ greatly both between different families and 
different localities. Thus, a 2013 study on Somali refugees 
living in Kenyan and Ethiopian camps found that less than one-
fifth of households interviewed said that they were receiving 
remittances, either as cash or, to a lesser extent, food (Grayson, 
2013). 
According to a 2011 study by the United States Bureau for 
Populations, Refugees and Migration (PRM), more than one-
third (37 per cent) of refugees in the Dadaab camp said that 
they received remittance support. In contrast, a 2016 Refugee 
Household Vulnerability Study on the Kakuma camp found 
that only six per cent of households stated that they received 
remittances (Guyatt, 2016, p. 17). 
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3.4 Translocal political engagement and 
“political remittances”
Refugees and political groups of the diaspora can play an im-
portant role, both negative and positive, in respect to their home 
countries and in relation to their own displacement, for instance 
by lobbying for political settlements allowing their return or 
mobilising against their home country to force their return. 
Against the image of diasporas, in particular in political debates 
on migration and development as relatively united and almost 
intrinsically capable of acting as a collective actor, Sinatti et 
al. (2010) highlight the fragmented nature of diasporas, both 
politically and socially. Unified diasporas such as the Eritrean 
diaspora during the Eritrean war of independence and the 
first years of independence as described by Hirt (2014) or the 
Rwandan ‘old’ diaspora that reuniting behind the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (Kraler, 2004; Prunier, 1998) are exceptions 
rather than the rule. The Eritrean diaspora, through feelings 
of belonging and national identity fostered by the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front, remained essentially united until the 
end of the Ethiopian–Eritrean war (Hirt, 2014). After the war, 
the diaspora fragmented to pro and anti-government supporters 
as well as a variety of civil society and human rights groups 
(Hirt, 2014). The Somali diaspora is organised along regional, 
clan, socio-economic, religious, gender, generational and 
political lines (Erdal & Horst, 2010; Bjork, 2007). Thus, while 
some of the wider diaspora community members supported 
and engaged in peace talks in Somalia, a different section of 
the Somali community facilitated conflict by funding groups 
like Al-Shabaab (Hammond et al., 2011). A similar pattern can 
be observed in the Afghan diaspora. Divisions along ethnicity, 
class, gender, location/region of origin and ideology are further 
intensified in exile, especially by economic, material and social 
remittances (Hanifi, 2006). This has resulted in a lack of suc-
cessful, broad-based, cross-party genuine initiatives from the 
Afghan diaspora that go beyond individual groups’ initiatives 
(Naby, 2004; Meininghaus & Mielke, 2019). 
Political engagement of diaspora groups in home countries 
often reflects the volatile nature of politics and ongoing 
conflicts there. Refugee communities then are often directly 
implicated in violence. Fiona Terry (2002) has shown the role of 
refugee camps in Thailand, Pakistan and the DRC as sanctu-
aries and a resource for armed factions in ongoing conflicts 
in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Rwanda and the DRC, and the 
complicity of humanitarian aid in fuelling the ‘refugee war-
rior’ phenomenon. In a similar vein, Mielke and Miszak (2017) 
argue that Afghan refugees in Pakistan could seldom escape the 
influence of radicals as they were ideologically bolstered with 
radical worldviews of their jihadi leaders’ politicised Islamic 
attitudes, madrasa curricula, school textbooks from Saudi 
Arabia, and ideologised school materials from other donors. 
Remittances are used to support livelihoods. Thus, families 
who received remittances in Kenya had a significantly better 
level of food security (TANGO International, 2011). Those 
who received remittances regularly used them to cover living 
expenses (Lindley, 2007). Remittances that were received only 
occasionally were used in times of particular need such as when 
other livelihood strategies collapsed, serious health or other 
issues (Lindley, 2007). Where there is more than one ‘investor’, 
remittances have been used to start businesses (Guyatt, 2016; 
Lindley, 2007). To illustrate: For most Afghan families in 
Pakistan, the majority of remittances from the United States is 
used to keep the family ‘alive’. In 2006, 68 per cent of respond-
ents used remittances from the United States as a vital source of 
income for food, clothes and medicine. Others used remittances 
as an emergency buffer to pay for ceremonies or repay loans. 
Only 11 per cent of respondents used their remittances to invest 
in a business or education (Hanifi, 2006). 
Remittances can be received from many sources. On the whole, 
remittances are received from refugees who ‘enjoyed’ mobility 
outside of camps and beyond (for instance through regular 
migration such as resettlement, or irregular onward movement 
for protection and/or labour motives). Thus Somali refugees 
in Kenyan and Ethiopian refugee camps received monthly 
remittances from relatives in the United States, other Western 
countries, Kenya itself (for instance its cities) (Lindley, 2007) 
and even, in a few instances, from Somalia (Grayson, 2013). 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran provide a good compar-
ison. Due to restrictive Pakistani policies, most Afghans in 
Pakistan work in low skilled, low wage jobs (World Bank Group, 
2019). There is, therefore, little capacity for Afghans in Pakistan 
to earn beyond the mere subsistence level (Kronenfeld, 2011; 
Sanchez, 2018). It is telling that while Afghans in Afghanistan 
receive around one-third of their remittances from Pakistan and 
Iran, Afghans in Pakistan are themselves beneficiaries of remit-
tances from OECD and Gulf countries (IOM, 2014). 
A study by Grayson (2017) on Somali refugees who live outside 
the region has found that among them there is a strong expecta-
tion that they send remittances to those who remain in camps. 
All those interviewed actually sent remittances. This places a 
substantial burden on refugees outside the region, impedes their 
chances of pursuing education or training opportunities, has a 
negative impact on their basic spending, forces the remitters to 
take on more than one job and to incur debts (Grayson, 2017; 
Hammond, 2011; Lindley, 2007). Nonetheless, remittances are 
seen by the Somali diaspora as a way to maintain transnational 
ties with the region (Horst, 2007). Parents of the diaspora teach 
their children on the social practices of how to remit money 
(Hammond et al., 2011).
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The literature on the role of the wider diaspora in development 
and humanitarian aid reveals that activities usually include 
a focus on the vulnerable and (mostly) internally displaced 
populations in the country of origin rather than those who are 
displaced in the region (Hammond et al., 2011). This is particu-
larly the case, where international humanitarian organisations 
have suspended their operations due to insecurity (Hammond 
et al., 2011). Members of the wider Somali diaspora commu-
nity expressed their preference for funding Somalis in Somalia 
rather than in the region, including in refugee camps. The reasons 
given were a preference to invest in Somalia, the higher price 
of funding people in the region compared to Somalia and the 
perception that the needs of people in refugee camps are met 
by the international community (Shandy & Das, 2016). Rather 
than investing in the physical infrastructure of refugee camps 
in the region, members of the wider Somali diaspora generally 
assisted refugees through financial remittances, preferring 
to support knowledge transfer in matters of education, health 
and technology as well as support intended return to Somalia 
(Shandy & Das, 2016). Afghan humanitarian and development 
associations in Germany have been found to focus on health, 
education, social affairs, cultural activities, religion, environ-
ment and technology, sports, politics and integration (Daxner & 
Nicola, 2017).
The greater access to Western governments regarding events  
in countries of origin, place diaspora groups in a more power- 
ful position (cf. Schmitz-Pranghe, 2010 on the Eritrean and 
Hammond et al., 2011 on the Somali diaspora). The Palestinian 
wider diaspora has lobbied governments and businesses to 
boycott, divest and sanction Israel and products of Israeli 
companies (Ananth, 2013). 
Another of the key areas of the wider diaspora engagement are 
peace talks and conflict resolution, as well as post-war recon-
struction and rehabilitation—a potentially important factor 
in contributing to ending protracted displacement situations 
(Hammond et al., 2011). Members of the Somali diaspora 
community supported peace talks by providing financial and 
other support to local administrations at municipal and regional 
levels, either directly or through local NGOs (Hammond et 
al., 2011). For instance, in Puntland and Galmudug (an auton-
omous region in central Somalia), the diasporas were main 
stakeholders in peace negotiations and provided funds for 
holding peace conferences and mediation efforts of inter-clan 
and intra-clan conflicts, resulting in several peace agreements 
between (sub)clans (Hammond et al., 2011).
Mielke (2019) argues that Afghan diaspora’s engagement has 
not been as systematic, unified or strategic as the activities 
of Kurdish, Armenian, Palestinian, Jewish and other dias-
pora groups. Besides the political particularism and divisive 
identities characteristic of Afghan society, part of the reason 
might also be the Cold War context and interpretation frame 
for the initial war that characterised the conflict thereafter and 
These forms of aid, channelled through major mujahidin parties 
that controlled specific camps in Pakistan, was a major contrib-
uting factor to radicalisation (Ghufran, 2011). 
Major divisions between refugee groups, however, may also 
stifle translocal political engagement. Thus, Congolese refugees 
in Uganda remain divided along ethnic lines, suspicious and 
fearful of members of other Congolese communities (Clark-
Kazak, 2011; Zakaryan & Antara, 2018; Russell, 2011; Lyyt-
inen, 2017a). In addition, external factors stifle any potential 
political engagement by this diaspora community. Considering 
Uganda’s role in destabilising the DRC by supporting various 
rebel groups during both Congo Wars (and allegedly after), 
some refugees fear they could be seen as collaborating with a 
hostile foreign entity if they were to attempt to engage in Con-
golese politics while hosted by Uganda (Zakaryan & Antara, 
2018). These sentiments, in turn, limit mobility, especially for 
voluntary repatriation and further undermine inter-community 
trust (Zakaryan & Antara, 2018). 
Moreover, in the case of Uganda, it was reported that UNHCR 
discouraged refugees from ‘talking politics’ (Clark-Kazak, 
2014). This, together with restricted mobility and freedom of 
association in the camps, as well as limited communication and 
transportation infrastructure, led to decreased political activity 
(Clark-Kazak, 2011).
Nonetheless, there is political engagement by refugee run 
NGOs and community-based organisations in countries of 
asylum that advocate for refugee rights (McQuaid, 2016) 
and that work to re-connect distrustful communities. For the 
Congolese communities, these include rights groups (McQuaid, 
2016; Lyytinen, 2017b), churches (Lyytinen, 2017b; Russell, 
2011), music bars (Russell, 2011) and institutions (Lyytinen, 
2017b; Dryden-Peterson, 2006). 
3.4.1  Transnational engagement of the wider diaspora
The literature reviewed suggests a relationship between citi-
zenship rights, economic resources and connectivity, allowing 
a higher degree of political and civic participation than in the 
case of communities “closer to home”. 
Thus Hammond et al. (2011) find that many local NGOs in So-
malia were started or are managed by those who returned from 
North America and Europe, while half of Somalia’s 26 cabinet 
members were returnees (for similar developments in Afghani-
stan, see Hanifi, 2006; for South Sudan, see Barnes et al., 2018). 
In Somalia, local NGOs have been found to be the main recip-
ients of donations for relief and development from the Somali 
diaspora. Over one-third of local NGOs included in a survey 
reported that they have connections to diaspora organisations, 
and diaspora representation on the boards of directors is very 
high (up to 82 per cent in south/central Somalia) (Hammond et 
al., 2011). 
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3.5  Social remittances
The term "social remittances", coined by Peggy Levitt, was 
introduced to demonstrate that migrants send more than mone-
tary remittances (cf. Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2011). Social re-
mittances can be defined as the ideas, behaviors, identities and 
social capital that flow from the receiving- to sending country 
communities. There seems to be relatively limited literature on 
‘social remittances’ in a refugee context. However, as Flores 
(2008) suggests for the Palestinian case, due to the extremely 
limited mobility of Palestinians, the ‘cultural’ or ‘social’ 
remittances play a vital role in Palestinian refugees’ lives and 
livelihoods. Batool (2015) notes, in particular, the role of cultural 
production and the arts. 
Grabska (2014) has shown how the experience in Kakuma 
camp, as well as access to global communication, technology 
and through contacts with resettled communities in Europe, 
the United States and Australia, has changed the way of doing 
things among the South Sudanese Nuer communities. This 
concerns, for example, the use of modern technologies as well 
as Western clothing.
Hansen (2014) demonstrated that returnees to Somaliland have 
played a significant role in transferring ideas and knowledge 
from ‘the West’ and raising issues relating to human rights, 
minority rights, good governance, the environment and the 
position and role of women in the society (Hansen, 2014). 
presented the global Afghan refugee community as victims 
whose patrons (the Western representatives of liberalism and 
democracy and later liberal peace) would manage, facilitate 
and determine the political affairs and future of Afghanistan. 
One exception, she notes are the activities of the royalist faction 
around the exiled Afghan King in Italy, whose so-called Rome 
group was part of the 2001 UN Talks on Afghanistan in which 
the post-Taliban dispensation was negotiated (but compare 
Meininghaus & Mielke, 2019 regarding recent peace initatives 
of Afghan groups in Germany). 
Wider diaspora engagement is, however, not always welcomed. 
Countries of origin place restrictions on foreign (including 
diaspora) funding for civil society organisations (Nimo-Ilhan, 
Frankenhaeuser, Noack & Schlaeger, 2012; Warnecke, 2010). 
Alternatively, development organisations limit their collabo-
ration with the wider diaspora from conflict-driven countries 
as a response to widespread concern regarding their political 
entanglement and high level of fragmentation (Sinatti et al., 
2010). Thus, the wider diaspora organisations, for instance 
from Ethiopia, can only engage in less contested issues related 
to development, reconstruction and humanitarian aid and only 
indirectly engage in activities that relate to democratisation, 
human rights and peacebuilding (Hoehne, Feyissa, Abdile & 
Schmitz-Pranghe, 2010; Warnecke, 2010). 
In her study of the Eritrean diaspora, Schmitz-Pranghe (2010) 
shows how the political engagement of the diaspora collapses in 
the face of post-Independence policies adopted by the authori-
tarian government. 
Grabska’s (2014) study "Gender, Home & Identity: Nuer Repatriation to Southern Sudan" describes the experience of young 
southern Sudanese who have returned to their communities of origin in southern Sudan and how their life in the refugee camps 
has transformed their identities and gender roles. The study shows that women from privileged social groups were more likely 
to be displaced to Kenya and Ethiopia, while those with a lower status were displaced within Sudan, mostly around Khartoum. 
Those displaced across the border had access to (limited) education, which increased their social position vis-à-vis men and 
women who had stayed behind. Those who lived around Khartoum were also confronted with Islamic norms and codes, which 
shaped gender relations of the mostly Christian Nuer in a more conservative way. 
The study illustrates how the perception of “being modern” of the southern Sudanese refugees changed during their experience 
in the refugee camps. For youths, this meant going to school, engage in the community, church and to learn about women’s and 
children’s rights, which altered their status in the community. “Because of the UN, school and church, Nuer in Kakuma became 
different. We are somehow ‘modern’ like you, civilised and pro-women” (quote from a Nuer boy, see Grabska, 2014, p. 65). 
For girls and women, the camp offered the possibility of education, even though only 11 per cent of those attending secondary 
school were female. Furthermore, the camp’s programmes on women’s rights and gender equality created images of gendered 
modernity. To some extent, men took over domestic tasks due to a lack of female relatives, and this behaviour was respected by 
other male refugees, but this often changed after return under the influence of local masculinity ideas. In that sense, Kakuma 
represented an extra-territorial space that transformed some gender and social relations. Nevertheless, this not only opened 
new possibilities for girls and women, it also resulted in a more articulated gender ideology of girls’ subordination and power 
asymmetries. 
Grabska (2014, p. 66) states that the “encounter between the ‘localised and de-territorialised refugee’ and global UN humanitar-
ianism which, combined with diasporic connections created through resettlement programmes, has opened new possibilities for 
change, so-called development, progress and empowerment”. 
Box 4: Transformed gender relations among South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma camp
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There are some noticeable gaps in research. Apart from limited 
knowledge about remittances, there is little systematic research 
on the impact of access to resettlement or family reunification 
on wider family networks or communities. In a similar vein, 
there is limited research on the relation between family migra-
tion policies and family patterns in a transnational setting and 
the context of displacement. 
Conversely, policymakers—largely following an individualistic 
logic—seem to ignore the impact of their policies (whether on 
resettlement or family reunion) on those left behind. This sug-
gests that there is a more fundamental gap between what may be 
important as a resource (and solution) on an individual level and 
what is considered as a relevant solution on an aggregate and 
political level. 
In the case of Uganda, many authors argued that there was no 
real ‘Congolese community’ because of the widespread mis-
trust between different groups discussed earlier, which limits 
the formation of associations linking different diaspora groups 
and their hometowns (cf. Lyytinen, 2017a). It was rather another 
actor that circulated ideas and practices specifically among the 
Congolese refugees in Uganda—the church. Lyytinen (2017a) 
and Russel (2011) reported that in this context, people were 
better able to trust each other. It can be argued that the activities 
of some Pentecostal churches in Uganda constitute a form of 
‘social remittance’ because they were run by members of the 
Congolese diaspora, sermons were held in French or Lingala 
were adjusted to the specific hardships and experiences of Con-
golese refugees in Kampala.
Another example is that of several Congolese bars in Kampala 
that, according to Russell (2011), were an important meeting 
point for Congolese refugees who could listen to rumba Lingala 
and as such remember their homes and temporarily forget about 
their current hardships. In a completely different setting, but 
similar to the Pentecostal churches, guests experienced a sense 
of home and community in these places and as such a relief 
from mistrust (Russell, 2011).
3.6  Summary: The role of mobility and 
connectivity
This section has demonstrated that mobility and connectivity 
can play an important role in displaced persons’ trajectories 
and livelihoods. While geographical mobility often responds 
to particular constraints, it also opens new opportunities. By 
and large, the literature seems to support the TRAFIG project’s 
hypothesis that mobility and connectivity can help to cope with 
protracted displacement situations. Research analysing receipt 
and use of remittances, for example, has shown how important 
remittances are for covering basic expenses. For some contexts, 
the reviewed literature has also demonstrated that displaced 
persons may also find more durable solutions for themselves by 
engaging in mobility and connectivity. 
At the same time, the literature reviewed for this section 
suggests that both mobility and connectivity have a stratifying 
effect, and so do policies that promote or hinder the develop-
ment of such connections.
Importantly, ‘connections’ can have both enabling and con-
straining effects. As research on the politics of displacement 
and diaspora mobilisation has demonstrated, refugees are often 
deeply implicated in ongoing conflicts, in both positive and 
negative ways. What different sections of any particular refugee 
population consider a ‘solution’ to both their predicament and 
any political project they subscribe to may radically differ from 
the solutions proposed by humanitarian agencies. 
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Beyond the three classical durable solutions
In a historical perspective, efforts to resolve protracted dis-
placement are diverse and highly context-dependent, devised 
in response to both domestic and international constraint and 
vary depending on opportunities and challenges in particular 
situations. Fridtjof Nansen’s reliance on a “bottom-up” ap-
proach, capitalising on refugees’ own preferences and abilities 
and involving different approaches to make refugees self-reliant 
thus partly was a strategy adopted to overcome the absence of 
multilateral humanitarian or development aid at the time and 
the limitations of relief provided by voluntary organisations. 
Mobility in this context was a pushed to achieve refugee’s 
self-reliance. The so-called Nansen passport became an impor-
tant instrument to realise mobility and attain the overarching 
objective.   
Understanding resettlement
As the paper has shown, the resettlement of refugees from 
mainly European to other destinations in Europe and overseas 
was an even more important tool to resolve displacement situa-
tions after World War II. In relative terms—measured in terms 
of refugees resettled each year—resettlement peaked in the 
immediate post-War period, with around one million persons 
resettled between the onset of large-scale resettlement in 1947 
and 1951. The resettlement of Indo-Chinese refugees, based on 
a political initiative to resolve displacement and restore asylum, 
was the second-largest effort in relative terms (see Figure 2, p. 11). 
The resettlement of Syrians—the single largest contemporary 
resettlement effort—never attained the same scale. One key 
difference between historical resettlement and contemporary 
resettlement efforts are the different objectives: Historically, 
resettlement was driven more by opportunities available to a 
select number of refugees to settle elsewhere and find employ-
ment than by the unavailability of local integration in the first 
receiving country, even if that had been an alternative. 
Camps and other place-based fixes
Camps have recurrently been used as a “spatial fix” (David 
Harvey) and as a means of containment. As evidence discussed 
in this paper shows, encampment severely limits opportunities. 
Basic social infrastructure established in camps, however, 
can also be a resource, engendering translocal strategies of 
displaced persons, splitting time (or families) between camps 
and urban areas. 
Conclusions
This working paper has shown that the search for solutions for 
longer-term refugee situations has been a key driver for the 
evolution of the international refugee protection regime ever 
since the emergence of an embryonic system of international 
refugee protection in the interwar period. The emergence of 
protracted displacement as a specific policy problem, however, 
is a consequence of a series of interrelated developments that 
occurred later. These included 
• the globalisation of the international refugee protection 
regime in the 1960s and 1970s,
• the growth of the global refugee population, 
• the changing availability of classical durable solutions to 
these new refugee populations, including the non-availa-
bility of resettlement through regular legal migration routes 
for most non-European refugees and the highly selective 
availability of alternative avenues to resettlement,
• the increasing reluctance of main receiving countries in the 
Global South to provide more than temporary solutions for 
refugees and
• the increasing funding challenges faced by UNHCR and 
other agencies to finance ‘care and maintenance’ of refugees 
in situations of long term exile.
From "solutions" to "durable solutions"
It is only recently that “solutions” have crystallised around the 
notion of “durable solutions” and the conventional triad of (vol-
untary) return, local integration and resettlement. The origin of 
this triad can be traced back to the late 1940s when it gradually 
became clear that neither repatriation nor resettlement was a 
viable option for significant numbers of displaced persons in 
post-War Europe. Local integration in that context was pro-
moted out of necessity, rather than choice, and despite the often 
challenging environment in receiving countries. At the same 
time, resettlement was understood in much broader terms than 
today, denoting different types of assisted mobility of refugees 
to third countries, rather than the relocation of particularly 
vulnerable groups, as resettlement is understood today.  
The term “durable solutions” is of more recent origin and has 
been used more frequently since the late 1970s. Paradoxically, 
its use multiplied in parallel with the appearance of the concept 
of “protracted refugee situations” in UNHCR from the late 
1990s onwards, that is, at a time when there was a growing 
awareness that durable solutions were out of reach for a 
growing number of displaced persons across the world. 
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In parallel to a shift towards encampment in many, and most 
recently in European, contexts, the promotion of return has 
increased, often accompanied by direct or indirect force. In 
many cases, such semi-voluntary returns result in secondary 
displacement or remigration, calling into question return as a 
“durable solution”. 
Mobility and connectivity as a resource for 
displaced persons
By and large, the literature supports the TRAFIG project’s 
hypothesis that mobility and connectivity can help refugees 
cope with protracted displacement. Research that analyses the 
receipt and use of remittances, for example, has shown how 
important remittances are for covering basic needs. In some 
cases, there is evidence that displaced persons who engage in 
mobility and connectivity may also find more durable solutions 
for themselves. At the same time, the literature suggests that 
mobility and connectivity have a stratifying effect, and so do 
policies that promote or hinder the development of such connec-
tions. This increases the gap between those who have access to 
mobility or translocal networks and those who do not. 
To what extent these largely individualised strategies can also 
provide pathways to “durable solutions” more widely and 
deployed by policymakers and humanitarian agencies, is one of 
the questions addressed by TRAFIG’s empirical research.   
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i 
 
Appendix 1: 
Overview of displacement in East Africa, the Horn of Africa,  
the Middle East and South Asia (AfPak) 
 
Region  Country of 
origin 
Period Caseloads/ Phases Geography of displacementi  
Middle 
East 
Palestine 1940s Palestine war (1947-49) 
The first Arab-Israeli war after the 
partitioning of Palestine into an Arab 
and Jewish state and establishment 
of Israel in 1948 
est. 700,000 (1948) - 951,000 
(1950)ii of those: 
 
Gaza (Egyptian) 
199,000 (1950) 
Jordan 
485,000 (1950) 
Lebanon 
128,000 (1950) 
Syria 
82,000 (1950) population growth 
to 418,000 (2001)iii 
IDPs in Israel  
46,000-48,000 (1948-49) 
population growth to 150,000-
250,000 (2000)iv  
East 
Africa 
DRC (Congo 
/ Zaire) 
1960s Provincial secession attempts 
(1960s) 
Post-independence provincial 
violence as part of secession 
attempts and growth of rebel groups 
Burundi 
25,000 (1966-67) 
51,000 (1980) - 60,000 (1989) 
Uganda 
34,000 (1964) - 35,000 (1969) 
34,000 (1970) - 34,000 (1979) 
32,000 (1980) - 31,000 (1986) 
East 
Africa 
Rwanda 1960s Revolution (1959-62) 
Hutu-led revolution on the eve of 
Rwandan independence   
Burundi 
30,000 (1961) - 36,000 (1969)  
32,000 (1970) - 49,000 (1979)  
180,000 (1980) - 210,000 (1989) 
max 230,000 (1982) 
DRC (Congo/Zaire)  
53,000 (1961) - 25,000 (1965) 
Tanzania  
27,000 (1974) - 26,000 (1979) 
Uganda 
52,000 (1961) - 71,000 (1969)  
72,000 (1970) - 78,000 (1979) 
80,000 (1980) - 75,000 (1989) 
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Ethiopia  
(& Eritrea) 
1960s Eritrean war of independence 
(1961-91) 
Between Ethiopian forces and 
Eritrean separatists 
 
Sudan 
29,000 (1967) - 31,000 (1969) 
 
ii 
 
Region  Country of 
origin 
Period Caseloads/ Phases Geography of displacementi  
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Sudan 1960s First civil war (1955-1972) 
The Sudanese army also crossed 
borders to Uganda and Ethiopia to 
‘return’ its refugees believed to 
harbour rebel groups 
DRC (Congo/Zaire) 
33,000 (1966) - 59,000 (1969) 
Uganda 
44,000 (1965) - 71,000 (1969)  
Middle 
East 
Palestine 1960s Six-day war (1967) 
Resulting in Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank Israel, Gaza Strip, Sinai, 
and the Golan Heights 
Displaced from West Bank and 
Gazav 
est. 350,000 
Egypt 
55,000 (1967) of whom 5,000 
previously registered with 
UNWRA 
Jordan 
200,000 (1967) of whom 95,000 
previously registered with 
UNWRA 
Syria 
85,000-110,000 (1967) of whom 
17,000 previously registered with 
UNWRA 
East 
Africa 
Burundi 1970s Ethnic violence / attempted coup 
(1972) 
While there were attempted post-
independence Hutu uprising that led 
to anti-Hutu purges in the 1960s, 
1972 saw a Hutu-led coup attempt 
leading to deaths of Tutsis and 
massacre (and flight) of Hutus 
Tanzania 
90,000 (1972) - 133,000 (1979) 
also to Rwanda, DRC (Zaire)vi 
East 
Africa 
Uganda 1970s Breakdown of State (1970s) 
 
Coup by Idi Amin (1971) 
By Idi Amin from Milton Obote, who 
purged the army, security forces and 
civil service, also killing tens of 
thousands of civilians 
Uganda-Tanzania War / Removal of 
Idi Amin (1979) 
By the Tanzanian army and the 
Ugandan National Liberation Army 
(UNLA), reinstalling Milton Obote  
DRC (Zaire) 
35,000 (1972-73) 
 
50,000 (1979) - 150,000 (1980) 
Sudan 
35,000 (1979) 
 
iii 
 
Region  Country of 
origin 
Period Caseloads/ Phases Geography of displacementi  
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Ethiopia  
(& Eritrea) 
1970s Eritrean war of independence (1961-
91, ramp up 1977-78) 
Between Ethiopian forces and 
Eritrean separatists. Major offensive 
by Ethiopian government against 
Eritrean opposition forces 1977-78 
Revolution / Military regime (1974) 
Prolonged revolution and oppressive 
and violent regime of Haile Selassie 
Border war with Somalia (1977-78) 
Spearheaded by Somalia’s president, 
Siad Barre, Somalia invades Ogaden 
region. Ethiopian Somalis flee. 
Djibouti 
29,000 (1979)  
 
Somalia  
500,000 (1977) – 1.2 milvii (1979) 
Sudan 
54,000 (1970) - 311,000 (1979) 
 
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Sudan 1970s First civil war (1955-72) 
The Sudanese army also crossed 
borders to Uganda and Ethiopia to 
‘return’ its refugees believed to 
harbour rebel groups 
DRC (Zaire) 
55,000 (1970) - 36,000 (1973) 
Uganda 
74,000 (1970) - 54,000 (1974) 
Ethiopia  
20,000 (1970) 
Middle 
East 
Lebanon 1970s Civil war / involvement of 
international actors (1975-82) 
Clashes between Phalangists and 
Palestinians led to entrance of Syrian 
troops in 1976 and two major 
invasions by Israel in 1978 and 1982 
(withdrawal in 2000) 
IDPsviii 
est. up to 1 mil of those: 
300,000 (1975-76) in Beirut 
150,00-200,000 Muslims & 65,000 
Palestinians (1978-82) by the 
Israeli 1978 invasion 
Middle 
East 
Iraq 1970s Political repression during Saddam 
Hussein regime (1979-2003) 
Iran 
30,000 (1979)  
South 
Asia 
Afghanistan 1970s Saur revolution (1978) 
People’s Democratic Party comes to 
power 
Soviet-Afghan war (1979-89) 
Fight of US-funded mujahidin groups 
out of Pakistan against Soviet forces 
backing the Afghan government 
Iran 
100,000 (1979) 
Pakistan 
400,000 (1979) 
East 
Africa 
Burundi 1980s Ethnic violence (1988) Rwanda 
53,000 (1988) 
Tanzania 
149,000 (1980) - 155,000 (1989) 
max 181,000 (1986) 
East 
Africa 
Uganda 1980s Breakdown of State (1980s) 
Civil war / Bush war (1981) 
Establishment of National Resistance 
Army (NRA), led by Museveni and 
made up of Bayankole and Tutsis 
 
Burundi 
26,000 (1984) - 33,000 (1985) 
DRC 
125,000 (1981) - 31,000 (1984) 
Rwanda 
38,000 (1982) - 30,000 (1984) 
 
iv 
 
Region  Country of 
origin 
Period Caseloads/ Phases Geography of displacementi  
Coup by Okello and Bush War (1985) 
Okello ousted Obote, continued to 
face opposition by NRA 
Beginning of LRA conflict (1986) 
NRA takes over Kampala with 
Museveni as president. Creation of 
Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) and its widespread violence 
against civilians 
Sudan 
73,000 (1980) - 100,000 (1987) 
max 250,000 (1985) 
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Ethiopia 1980s Famine (1984-1986) 
 
Djibouti 
45,000 (1980) - 29,000 (1983) 
Somalia  
2 mil (1980) - 770,000 (1989) 
Sudan 
411,000 (1980) - 685,000 (1989)  
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Somalia 1980s Civil War with separatists (1987-91) 
Somali government forces fighting 
rebels seeking independence for 
northwest Somalia. Civil war leads to 
collapse of President Siad Barre’s 
regime. 
Djibouti 
30,000 (1989) 
Ethiopia 
60,000 (1987) - 325,000 (1989) 
IDPsix 
500,000 (1980s) 
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Sudan 1980s Second civil war (1983-2005) 
Between Sudan People’s Liberation 
Front and government Forces 
Uganda 
53,000 (1989) 
Ethiopia 
31,000 (1983) - 385,000 (1989) 
IDPsx 
35,000 (1983) - 1.9 mil (1989) 
Middle 
East 
Lebanon 1980s Civil war / involvement of 
international actors (1975-82) 
Clashes between Phalangists and 
Palestinians led to entrance of Syrian 
troops in 1976 and two major 
invasions by Israel in 1978 and 1982 
(withdrawal in 2000) 
Civil war (1983-91) 
Due to sectarian divisions, and the 
re-entrance of Syrian troops in 1989.  
Syria  
27,000 (1983) - 33,000 (1985) 
 
 
IDPsxi 
367,000 (1985) (from Mount 
Lebanon region) 
 
est. 150,000 (1989) (fighting 
between Christian militia and 
Syrian troops)  
Middle 
East 
Iraq 1980s Political repression during Saddam 
Hussein regime (1979-2003) 
Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) 
Caused widespread flight of Shiia and 
political dissidents 
Anti-Kurdish campaigns (1986-88) 
Destruction of up to 4,000 villages 
and displacing Iraqi Kurds 
Iran 
30,000 (1980) - 500,000 (1989) 
 
also Syria 
IDPsxii  
est. 1 mil 
 
v 
 
Region  Country of 
origin 
Period Caseloads/ Phases Geography of displacementi  
South 
Asia 
Afghanistan 1980s Soviet-Afghan war (1979-89) 
Fight of US-funded Mujahideen 
groups out of Pakistan against Soviet 
forces backing the Afghan 
government 
Iran 
300,000 (1980) - 2.3 mil (1989) 
Pakistan 
1.4 mil (1980) - 3.3 mil (1989) 
IDPsxiii 
1.5-2.2 mil (1979-89) 
East 
Africa 
Burundi 1990s Ethnic violence / political instability 
(1990s) 
 
Ethnic Violence (1991) 
Outbreak of clashes 
Presidential assassination (1993) 
Democratically elected Hutu 
president, Melchior Ndadaye, 
assassinated by Tutsis creating an 
outbreak of violence leading to Hutus 
fleeing 
Military coup (1996) 
Triggering another civil war forcing 
Hutus to flee 
Low-intensity warfare (second half 
1990s) 
Including ‘regroupment’ through 
forcibly relocating 600,000 into 
camps under military supervision 
DRC (Zaire)  
41,000 (1991) - 47,000 (1997) 
Rwanda 
34,000 (1991) - 250,000 (1993) 
Tanzania 
155,000 (1990) - 499,000 (1999) 
538,000 (2000) - 54,000 (2009) 
max 541,000 (2002) 
IDPs 
90,000 (1994) - 50,000-800,000xiv 
(1999) 
max 883,000 (1996) 
56,000 (2000) - 100,000 (2009) 
East 
Africa 
DRC (Zaire) 1990s Ethnic violence 
Violence of provincial (Katangese) 
authorities against non-native 
population, mainly Kasaians 
Incursions by Rwandan forces  
(mid-1990s) 
Hutu militias conducting cross border 
attacks from DRC into Rwanda were 
targeted by Rwandan forces on DRC 
(Zairean territory). Attacks on Zairean 
Tutsi’s also took place 
Breakdown of state / First Congo 
War / Kabila takeover (1996-97) 
Kabila marched on the capital of 
Zaire with the assistance of Uganda 
and Rwanda 
Second Congo War (1998-2003) 
Kabila angered countries that helped 
him to power, and they retaliated 
triggering the Second Congo War 
(also called as the African Holocaust / 
Great War of Africa) 
 
Burundi 
26,000 (1990-93) 
 
Rwanda 
27,000 (1997) - 33,000 (1999) 
Tanzania  
55,000 (1996) - 99,000 (1999) 
Uganda 
29,000 (1996) 
 
IDPsxv 
est. 670,000 (1992-93) - 960,000 
(1999) 
 
vi 
 
Region  Country of 
origin 
Period Caseloads/ Phases Geography of displacementi  
 
East 
Africa 
Rwanda 1990s Rwandan civil war / genocide (1994) 
Armed incursion by Rwandan 
Patriotric Front (RPF), a movement 
founded in Uganda, by Rwandan 
exiles, in October 1990 and civil war 
and radicalisation, assassination of 
Rwandan President, followed by 
genocide and partly state-led 
movement into exile  
 
 
 
Burundi 
240,000 (1990) - 150,000 (1995) 
max 280,000 (1994) 
DRC  
51,000 (1991) - 33,000 (1999) 
max 1.25 mil (1994) 
46,000 (2000) - 220,000 (2018) 
max 245,000 (2016) 
Tanzania 
50,000 (1991) – 420,000 (1995) 
max 620,000 (1994) 
Uganda  
82,000 (1990) - 97,000 (1994) 
IDPs  
300,000 (1994), 625,000 (1998) 
East 
Africa 
Uganda 1990s LRA conflict reaches civil war 
threshold (1994) 
By measurement of 1,000 battle-
related deaths. LRA is also backed by 
the Sudanese government (Museveni 
backs Sudan’s People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army 
DRC 
44,000 (1997) 
Sudan 
40,000 (1990)  
IDPsxvi 
270,000 (1996) displaced to Gulu 
district, 80,000 to Kitgum 
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Eritrea 1990s War of independence with Ethiopia 
(from 1991) 
Border war with Ethiopia (1998-
2000) 
Indefinite military (national) service 
(1990s) 
Sudan 
500,000 (1991) - 340,000 (1999) 
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Ethiopia 1990s War with Eritrea (from 1993) Somalia 
460,000 (1990) 
Sudan 
856,000 (1990) – 35,000 (1999) 
IDPsxvii 
est. 151,000-168,000 (1998-2005) 
est. max 360,000 (2000) 
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Somalia 1990s State collapse (1991) 
Intensified conflict to remove Siad 
Barre from power. Conflict spreads 
from South Central Somalia to 
Puntland. The 1991-92 drought 
exacerbates the effects of conflict 
Djibouti 
76,000 (1990) - 85,000 (1991) 
25,000 (2003) 
Ethiopia  
386,000 (1990) – 181,000 (1999) 
max 514,000 (1991) 
121,000 (2000) - 59,000 (2009) 
Kenya 
96,000 (1991) - 141,000 (1999) 
max 286,000 (1992) 
137,000 (2000) - 310,000 (2009) 
 
vii 
 
Region  Country of 
origin 
Period Caseloads/ Phases Geography of displacementi  
IDPs 
est. max 2 mil (1992),xviii 200,000 
(1996-97)  
400,000 (2005) - 1.5 mil (2009) 
1.4 mil (2010)xix 
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Sudan 1990s Second civil war (1983-2005) 
Between Sudan People’s Liberation 
Front and government Forces 
DRC 
71,000 (1990) - 68,000 (1999) 
Ethiopia 
388,000 (1990) - 70,000 (1999) 
34,000 (2000) 
Uganda 
62,000 (1990) - 200,000 (1999) 
IDPsxx 
est. 920,000 (1993) - 1.5 mil 
(1994), 4 mil (1999) 
Middle 
East 
Iraq 1990s Political repression during Saddam 
Hussein regime (1979-2003) 
Kuwait war (1990-91) 
Iraqi army sent to Kuwait in 1990 
prompting the US Operation Desert 
Storm in 1991 and ongoing sanctions 
Kurdish uprisings (-) 
US promised support to Kurds, which 
did not eventuate across two 
uprisings, both crushed by Iraqi 
military 
Shiia uprising (1991-2002) 
Brutally crushed by Iraqi military 
Iran 
1.1 mil (1990) - 510,000 (1999)  
max 1.2 mil (1992) 
Syria 
35,000 (1993) - 27,000 (1997) 
IDPs 
32,000 (1996) - 35,000 (1997) 
(Kurdish uprising 500,000 IDPs on 
border with Turkey / Shiia 
uprising 300,000 IDPs)xxi 
 
Middle 
East 
Lebanon 1990s Israeli air raids / rocket attacks 
(1996) 
Following Hizballah rocket attacks on 
the north of its country, Israel 
retaliated with vast air raids against 
Beirut and southern Lebanese 
villages.  
IDPs 
est. 400,000 (1996)xxii 
est. 50,000 - 600,000 (2001-04) 
(by different sources)xxiii 
200,000 (2006) - 70,000 (2007)  
South 
Asia 
Afghanistan 1990s Civil war (1990-96) 
War of Mujahideen against 
Communist government until 1992, 
followed by fighting among various 
Mujahideen factions, leading to 
entrance of the Taliban into the 
conflict in 1994 and its victory 
through the seizure of Kabul 
Oppressive Taliban rule (1996-2000) 
With ongoing opposition by the 
United Front (Northern Alliance) 
 
Iran 
3 mil (1990) - 1.3 mil (1999) 
max 3.2 mil (1991) 
Pakistan 
3.2 mil (1990) - 1.2 mil (1999) 
IDPs  
300,200 (1994) - 250,000 (1999) 
 
viii 
 
Region  Country of 
origin 
Period Caseloads/ Phases Geography of displacementi  
East 
Africa 
DRC 2000s Violent Peace (2000s) 
Following the signing of the 2002 Sun 
City Accords, violence subsides. 
People are still displaced by Tutsi-led 
M23 militia and government forces. 
Combined with Congolese 
government’s inability to take care of 
its IDPs. 
Burundi 
26,000 (2000) - 48,000 (2004) 
Rwanda 
27,000 (2000) - 54,000 (2009) 
Tanzania 
110,000 (2000) - 63,000 (2009) 
max 153,000 (2004) 
Uganda 
29,000 (2006) - 73,000 (2009) 
IDPs 
1 mil (2006) - 2 mil (2009) 
1.5 mil (2000) - 2.3 mil (2002)xxiv 
East 
Africa  
Uganda 2000s Operation Iron Fist I and II  
(2002 & 2004) 
Launched by Ugandan government 
against LRA, also inflicting civilian 
suffering  
Operation Iron Thunder (2008-09) 
Launched by Ugandan government 
against LRA but also inflicting civilian 
suffering. Signing of Cessation of 
Hostilities Agreement (2006), with 
LRA gradually moving across borders 
to DRC and CAR 
IDPs 
est. 400,000 (2002) - 2 mil 
(2005),xxv 1.6 mil (2006) - 446,000 
(2009) 
126,000 (2010) - 180,000 (2018) 
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Eritrea 2000s Regime oppression / persecution / 
indefinite military service (2000s) 
Border conflict with Djibouti (2009) 
Sudan 
368,000 (2000) - 114,000 (2009) 
Ethiopia 
36,000 (2009)  
IDPs 
1.1 mil (2000) 
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Sudan 2000s Second civil war (1983-2005) 
Between Sudan People’s Liberation 
Front and government forces.  
 
War in Darfur (from 2003) 
Between government troops and two 
rebel groups Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army and the Justice and 
Equality Movement 
DRC 
73,000 (2000) - 45,000 (2004) 
Ethiopia 
72,000 (2000) - 26,000 (2008) 
Uganda 
210,000 (2000) - 30,000 (2009) 
IDP 
660,000 (2004) - 1 mil (2009) 
(est. 4 mil (2000), 4.3 mil (2002) - 
5.3-6.7 mil (2004)  
(est. 1.6 (2004) - 1.8 mil (2005) in 
Darfur)xxvi 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
Region  Country of 
origin 
Period Caseloads/ Phases Geography of displacementi  
Middle 
East 
Iraq 2000s Political repression during Saddam 
Hussein regime (1979-2003) 
US (and allies) invasion / sectarian 
violence (2003-11 / 2006-08) 
The US invasion leads to disenfran- 
chisement, mainly by Sunni militants 
and kickstarting sectarian violence 
between Sunni and Shiia of 2006-08. 
Iran 
386,000 (2000) - 48,000 (2009) 
Jordan 
519,000 (2006) - 450,000 (2009) 
Lebanon 
50,000 (2007-09) 
Syria 
700,000 (2006) - 1 mil (2009) 
IDPs 
1.2 mil (2005) - 1.5 mil (2009) 
South 
Asia 
Afghanistan 2000s US (and allies) intervention (2001-
14) 
Involvement of US post the 9/11 
bombings, leading allies in 
cooperation with the Northern 
Alliance, which takes Kabul in 2002. 
Post the Bonn Peace agreement, the 
new Afghan government slowly loses 
legitimacy with the deterioration of 
the security situation.   
Iran  
1.5 mil (2000) - 1 mil (2009) 
Pakistan 
2 mil (2000) 1.7 mil (2009) 
Max 2.2 mil (2002) 
IDPs  
760,000 (2000) - 300,000 (2009)  
max 1.2 mil (2001) 
East 
Africa 
Burundi 2010s Attempted coup (2015) 
President Nkurunziza allowed to run 
for a third term by Constitutional 
Court of Burundi, leading to protests 
and an attempted coup. 
DRC 
36,000 (2016) - 43,000 (2018) 
Rwanda 
71,000 (2015) - 68,000 (2018) 
Tanzania 
47,000 (2010) - 252,000 (2018) 
438,000 (2017) 
IDPs 
157,000 (2010) - 32,000 (2018) 
East 
Africa 
DRC 2010s Violent Peace (2010s) 
Government forces, M23, and other 
regional and ethnic clashes (eg, Kasai 
region) 
Eg, Kasai region uprising / ethnic 
clashes (2016 – not yet PRS) 
Violent uprising by Kamwina Nsapu, a 
local militia against state security 
forces 
Burundi 
40,000 (2010) - 75,000 (2018) 
Rwanda 
55,000 (2010) - 79,000 (2018) 
Tanzania 
61,000 (2010) - 84,000 (2018) 
Uganda 
87,000 (2010) – 313,000 (2018) 
IDPs 
1.7 mil (2010) – 4.5 mil (2018) 
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Eritrea 2010s Indefinite military service (2010s) Ethiopia  
45,000 (2010) - 174,000 (2018) 
Sudan 
106,000 (2010) - 121,000 (2018)  
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Ethiopia 2010s Inter-communal and cross-border 
violence 
Kenya 
35,000 (2010) - 28,000 (2018) 
 
x 
 
Region  Country of 
origin 
Period Caseloads/ Phases Geography of displacementi  
IDPs 
1 mil (2017) - 2.6 mil (2018) 
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Somalia 2010s Famine (2011) 
IDP’s are subject to militia violence 
and exploitation 
Ethiopia 
81,000 (2010) - 257,000 (2018) 
Kenya 
352,000 (2010) - 352,000 (2018) 
max 518,000 (2011) 
IDPs 
1.5 mil (2010) - 2.6 mil (2018) 
 
Horn 
of 
Africa 
South 
Sudan 
2010s South Sudanese civil war (from 
2012) 
Conflict between Sudanese Armed 
Forces and Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement-North as well as internal 
conflict in Jonglei State 
Ethiopia 
59,000 (2012) - 422,000 (2018) 
Kenya 
34,000 (2012) - 115,000 (2018) 
Sudan  
115,000 (2014) - 852,000 (2018) 
Uganda 
158,000 (2014) - 789,000 (2018) 
IDPs 
560,000 (2011) - 1.9 mil (2018) 
Horn 
of 
Africa 
Sudan 2010s Conflict across various regions  
(incl. Darfur)  
Including battling rebels from the 
Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement-North 
Environmentally-induced 
displacement (from 2011) 
Ethiopia 
25,000 (2010) - 44,000 (2018) 
South Sudan 
77,000 (2011) - 270,000 (2018) 
IDPs 
1.6 mil (2010) - 1.8 mil (2018) 
max 3.2 mil (2015) 
Middle 
East 
Syria 2010s Civil war (from 2011) 
Expanded to many factions in 2012 
Iraq 
64,000 (2012) - 253,000 (2018) 
Jordan 
239,000 (2012) - 676,000 (2018) 
Lebanon 
127,000 (2012) - 1 mil (2018) 
Turkey 
249,000 (2012) - 3.6 mil (2018) 
IDPs 
2 mil (2012) - 6.3 mil (2018) 
max 7.6 mil (2014) 
 
xi 
 
Region  Country of 
origin 
Period Caseloads/ Phases Geography of displacementi  
Middle 
East 
Iraq 2010s Emergence of Islamic State (2013) 
Captured Mosul. Expanded into the 
Caliphate and become a major 
faction in the Syrian civil war 
Operations against Islamic State 
(2016-17) 
Jordan 
450,000 (2010) - 68,000 (2018) 
Syria 
1 mil (2010) - 32,000 (2018) 
Turkey 
32,000 (2013) - 142,000 (2018) 
IDPs 
1.3 mil (2010) - 1.8 mil (2018) 
South 
Asia 
Afghanistan 2010s US (and allies) intervention (2001-
14) 
US and allies drawdown and 
withdraw in 2013. The security 
situation continues to drastically 
deteriorate. 
Iran 
1 mil (2010) - 950,000 (2018) 
Pakistan 
1.9 mil (2010) - 1.4 mil (2018) 
IDPs  
35,000 (2010) - 2.1 mil (2018) 
 
Sources 
i Note all data are from the UNHCR data portal (http://popstats.unhcr.org), except where otherwise noted. Many of 
the figures, especially historical and of IDPs, are estimates.  
ii  UNWRA (2002). 
iii  Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project (2002b, pp. 7–8, 14). 
iv  Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project (2002b, pp. 7–8, 14). 
v  UNGA (1967). 
vi  Holborn (1975, p. 988). 
vii  mil= milllion 
viii  Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project (2004, pp. 20, 28). 
ix  World Bank Group (2014, p. 11). 
x  Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project (2005a, p. 64). 
xi  Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project (2004, p. 21). 
xii  Thibos (2014, p. 2). 
xiii  Mielke (2019, p. 5). 
xiv  The higher figure is from: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2006, p. 9). 
xv  Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project (2002a, pp. 11–12). 
xvi  Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project (2005b, pp. 42–43). 
xvii  Global IDP Project (2005). 
xviii  World Bank Group (2014, p. 11). 
xix  World Bank Group (2014, p. 11). 
xx  Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project (2005a, pp. 18, 64, 68). 
xxi  Thibos (2014, p. 3). 
xxii  Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project (2004, p. 22). 
xxiii  Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project (2004, p. 22). 
xxiv  Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project (2002a, pp. 11–12). 
xxv  Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project (2005b, p. 7). 
xxvi  Norwegian Refugee Council and Global IDP Project (2005a, pp. 9, 25). 
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Appendix 2: 
Protracted refugee situations characterised by size, end-2018 
 
Source: UNHCR (2019, p. 23) 
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